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LEAN ON ME: A PHYSICIAN’S FIDUCIARY DUTY 
TO DISCLOSE AN EMERGENT MEDICAL RISK 
TO THE PATIENT 
THOMAS L. HAFEMEISTER∗  
SELINA SPINOS∗∗  
ABSTRACT 
This analysis has two purposes. The first is to establish that physicians 
owe their patients a fiduciary duty. Courts and commentators have widely 
acknowledged that this duty exists because of the nature of the special 
relationship between a physician and a patient. Application of this duty 
has been sparse, however, in part because its jurisprudential foundation 
has received virtually no attention. This Article explores that foundation 
and establishes the strong basis for recognizing and applying this 
doctrine. 
The second purpose is to apply this doctrine to an issue that has 
generated considerable attention, both within and outside the medical 
profession: the concern that some physicians are failing to disclose 
medical errors and other emergent medical risks (collectively referred to 
as EMRs) to patients who are unaware of these developments. There is 
widespread recognition that patients want and need to trust their doctors 
and the hospitals to which they turn for help in times of sickness and 
injury. This Article asserts that physicians’ fiduciary duty to patients 
encompasses a duty to disclose EMRs to patients who are unaware of 
them. Although most physicians and professional organizations agree that 
such disclosures should be readily provided, these disclosures are not 
always forthcoming. Recognizing a fiduciary-based duty to disclose will 
encourage physicians to share crucial information with patients, which in 
turn will enable patients to avoid or mitigate potential harm. By routinely 
disclosing this information, physicians will deepen the trust of their 
patients in them and thereby facilitate the partnership between patients 
and physicians that should be the hallmark of health care. 
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INTRODUCTION 
During medical treatment, a physician may discover or cause a medical 
condition that could result in material harm to the patient. In other words, 
an emergent medical risk (EMR) may arise—something that neither the 
physician nor the patient knew about when treatment began, but that now 
poses a risk of harm to the patient. 
Picture two scenarios involving a cholecystectomy, a surgical 
procedure intended to remove the gallbladder. In the first scenario, a 
physician accidentally nicks the patient’s bile duct with a surgical 
instrument. The physician immediately stitches up the bile duct, and the 
damage seems fully repaired. Later, when preparing the patient for 
discharge, the doctor explains that she had to repair the nicked bile duct 
during surgery. After reassuring the patient that he should be fine, the 
physician tells the patient that the repair puts him at greater risk of a 
stricture—or narrowing—of the bile duct. The doctor tells the patient, “Be 
alert for any pain in the right upper quadrant of your abdomen and for 
symptoms of jaundice such as yellowing, which you would probably first 
see in the whites of your eyes. If you feel pain in this area or notice any 
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2009] LEAN ON ME 1169 
 
 
 
 
signs of jaundice, please call me immediately. I don’t expect this to 
happen, but you should know about this risk and contact me if symptoms 
develop.”  
In the second scenario, a physician flawlessly performs a gallbladder 
surgery. But while operating, he notices a benign (noncancerous) tumor of 
the liver, known as a hemangioma. The doctor knows that this type of 
tumor usually does not cause patients any problems and thus does not 
require immediate removal, but recognizes that this condition could lead to 
bleeding during pregnancy or after external trauma. When the patient is 
stabilized after surgery, the doctor informs her of the hemangioma. After 
reassuring the patient that this benign tumor will probably never cause her 
any trouble, the physician warns her, “There’s a small chance that if you 
are pregnant or suffer external trauma, as might occur in a car accident, 
this benign tumor may result in internal bleeding. If you become pregnant 
or are injured in an accident, please mention this condition to your treating 
physician.”  
Both of these scenarios involve medical risks that either did not exist or 
were unknown prior to treatment. Rather, these risks emerged as the result 
of the physician’s conduct or the physician’s discovery of a previously 
unknown medical condition. In the first scenario, the physician caused the 
risk through a medical error—a risk that remained even after the physician 
repaired the damage of the nicked bile duct. In the second scenario, the 
physician performing an unrelated procedure just happened to notice a 
medical condition likely to pose a future risk to the patient. Both of these 
medical conditions were unknown before surgery and became evident only 
during the course of treatment. Both should result in a disclosure of the 
condition to the patient to prevent or minimize future harm.  
In each scenario described above, the physician took appropriate steps 
to disclose the emergent risk. By sharing needed information about the 
risk and the possibility of future harm, the doctor enabled the patient to 
guard against a known risk. Unfortunately, a different approach may be 
used by some physicians. When mishaps or discoveries occur, a doctor 
may fail to inform the patient of the EMR. As this Article will assert, the 
failure to disclose EMRs not only strays from sound medical practice, but 
also violates a physician’s fiduciary duty to the patient. In both of the 
scenarios described above, unless the physician discloses the EMR, the 
patient will likely not learn of these risks until they manifest themselves as 
a dangerous medical complication. As a result, the patient may suffer 
serious harm that could have been readily prevented by the physician with 
a brief discussion. In the scenarios presented, disclosure is not just the 
right thing to do—it is a legal duty. Whenever physicians become aware of 
Washington University Open Scholarship
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EMRs that materially endanger the medical condition of their patients, 
these doctors have a fiduciary duty to give their patients information that 
will enable them to protect themselves from harm.1  
The first Part of this Article describes how ethical codes governing 
medical behavior already direct physicians to disclose EMRs, and that 
many regulatory bodies and states similarly require physicians to provide 
these disclosures. The next Part notes that despite widespread consensus 
on the need for disclosure, such disclosures are not always forthcoming. 
This Article then argues for broader recognition that physicians have a 
legal duty to disclose EMRs to their patients—a duty that flows from 
fiduciary law. As will be discussed, physicians owe various fiduciary 
obligations to their patients, including a duty to disclose to their patients 
any needed medical information related to treatment. EMRs are adverse 
medical conditions that the physician has discovered or caused in the 
course of treatment of which the patient is likely unaware and that could 
result in material harm to the patient if not disclosed. Disclosing these 
risks falls within the scope of a physician’s fiduciary responsibilities.  
After examining lawsuits that have identified a breach of the 
physician’s fiduciary obligation to a patient, the Article addresses some 
steps that physicians must take to satisfy this duty. The Article details the 
elements, defenses, and damages associated with a claim for breach of 
fiduciary duty. It also explains why this cause of action is more 
appropriate than a medical-malpractice or informed-consent claim. After 
addressing what a physician should do when another doctor fails to 
disclose, the Article highlights some benefits of enforcing a fiduciary duty 
to disclose EMRs.  
I. CURRENT RESPONSES TO EMERGENT MEDICAL RISKS (EMRS) 
Medical errors vividly illustrate one facet of EMRs. In the landmark 
report To Err Is Human, the Institute of Medicine found that between 
44,000 and 98,000 people die each year from medical errors in American 
hospitals and that these errors cost the nation between $17 and $29 billion 
every year.2 These startling statistics provoked cries for health-care reform 
 
 
 1. See infra Part V. Although the following discussion focuses on physicians, the analysis 
provided applies to all health-care providers when the equivalent of a physician-patient relationship 
has been established.  
 2. COMMITTEE ON QUALITY OF HEALTH CARE IN AMERICA, INSTITUTE OF MEDICINE, TO ERR 
IS HUMAN: BUILDING A SAFER HEALTH SYSTEM 1 (Linda T. Kohn et al. eds., 2000). Medical error 
encompasses not only inadequate care, but typically also adverse medical events that involved 
unintended acts of omission or commission, or acts that fall short of the intended outcome. JOINT 
https://openscholarship.wustl.edu/law_lawreview/vol86/iss5/3
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to reduce the occurrence and impact of medical error. But even if better 
systems are implemented to reduce medical error, doctors acknowledge 
that errors are as unavoidable as death and taxes.3 As fallible human 
beings performing complex, demanding, and sometimes unpredictable 
procedures, physicians will occasionally fail to meet their aspirations of 
flawless diagnoses and treatment.4  
Indeed, recent studies reveal that, despite extensive efforts to reduce 
medical errors,5 these errors continue and are unlikely to vanish from the 
medical landscape. In 2007, the widely respected health-care rating 
organization, HealthGrades, Inc., reported on patient safety in American 
hospitals.6 Analyzing data gathered between 2003 and 2005, the study 
found that 1.16 million incidents threatening patient safety occurred in 
over 40 million Medicare-funded hospitalizations.7 Further, the rates 
associated with more than half of the various specific patient-safety 
indicators studied had worsened over these years.8 Because of various 
disincentives to reporting mistakes, errors may be even more frequent.9  
Until the twenty-first century, most medical errors were shrouded by 
silence.10 Today, medical scholars and practitioners recognize the value of 
 
 
COMMISSION, 2002 HOSPITAL ACCREDITATION STANDARDS 339 (2002); see also Lucien L. Leape, 
Error in Medicine, 272 JAMA 1851, 1851 (1994). 
 3. ROBERT M. WACHTER & KAVEH G. SHOJANIA, INTERNAL BLEEDING: THE TRUTH BEHIND 
AMERICA’S TERRIFYING EPIDEMIC OF MEDICAL MISTAKES 369 (2005).  
 4. See, e.g., JEROME GROOPMAN, HOW DOCTORS THINK 24 (2007) (noting that up to fifteen 
percent of medical diagnoses are inaccurate).  
 5. For example, the Institute of Medicine (IOM) has engaged in efforts since 1996 to assess and 
improve the nation’s quality of health care. Institute of Medicine of the National Academies, Crossing 
the Quality Chasm: The IOM Health Care Initiative, http://www.iom.edu/CMS/8089.aspx (last visited 
Mar. 31, 2009) (including a list of more than a dozen released reports). See also Centers for Medicare 
and Medicaid Services, Quality Initiatives, General Information, http://www.cms.hhs.gov/quality 
initiativesgeninfo/ (last visited Mar. 31, 2009) (describing the CMS Quality Initiative, launched in 
2001, which includes the Nursing Home Quality Initiative, the Home Health Quality Initiative, the 
Hospital Quality Initiative, the Physician Focused Quality Initiative, the End Stage Renal Disease 
Quality Initiative, and the Physician Voluntary Reporting Program); The Leapfrog Group, Informing 
Choices, Rewarding Excellence, Getting Health Care Right (2007), http://www.leapfroggroup.org/ 
home (“On behalf of the millions of Americans for whom many of the nation’s largest corporations 
and public agencies buy health benefits, The Leapfrog Group aims to: [r]educe preventable medical 
mistakes . . . .”). 
 6. HEALTH GRADES, INC., HEALTHGRADES QUALITY STUDY: FOURTH ANNUAL PATIENT 
SAFETY IN AMERICAN HOSPITALS STUDY (Apr. 2007), available at http://www.healthgrades.com/ 
media/DMS/pdf/PatientSafetyInAmericanHospitalsStudy2007.pdf. 
 7. Id. at 2. Moreover, as Medicare-funded hospitalizations constitute only a portion of all 
hospitalizations, the total number of patients experiencing these incidents is even higher than reported. 
 8. Id. 
 9. See Maxine M. Harrington, Revisiting Medical Error: Five Years After the IOM Report, 
Have Reporting Systems Made a Measurable Difference?, 15 HEALTH MATRIX 329, 332 (2005). 
 10. Kurt Darr, Uncircling the Wagons: Informing Patients About Unanticipated 
Outcomes, HOSP. TOPICS, Summer 2001, at 33, 33; see also WACHTER & SHOJANIA, supra note 3, at 
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disclosing medical mistakes. They have expressed widespread agreement 
that patients have a need—and a right—to know when medical errors 
involving them have occurred.11 Hospitals in turn have heeded this 
message, and most promote some form of disclosure.12 A recent survey of 
institutional risk managers revealed that sixty-nine percent have 
established disclosure practices.13 In March 2006, a consensus statement of 
Harvard-affiliated hospitals declared the value of disclosing errors to 
patients, taking responsibility for these errors, and making efforts to 
prevent future errors.14 
The duty to disclose errors and other emergent risks has been widely 
embraced as a principle of medical ethics by various professional 
organizations. This includes the American Medical Association (AMA), 
whose ethical code has been accepted as the professional code for 
physicians by virtually all state medical societies, which in turn license 
and regulate the behavior of physicians.15 The AMA’s Code of Medical 
Ethics states: 
It is a fundamental ethical requirement that a physician should at all 
times deal honestly and openly with patients. Patients have a right 
 
 
24 (“This lack of understanding [of why medical errors happen] is attributable [in part] . . . to the 
difficulty that outsiders have in breaking through [health care professionals’ and administrators’] 
culture, language, and, yes, our code of silence.”).  
 11. See, e.g., WACHTER & SHOJANIA, supra note 3, at 291; Steven Berman, Reporting Outcomes 
and Other Issues in Patient Safety: An Interview with Albert Wu, 28 JOINT COMMISSION J. ON 
QUALITY IMPROVEMENT 197, 198 (2002); Darr, supra note 10, at 35; Thomas H. Gallagher et al., 
Patients’ and Physicians’ Attitudes Regarding the Disclosure of Medical Errors, 289 JAMA 1001, 
1001 (2003) (noting that error disclosure “respects patient autonomy and truth-telling, is desired by 
patients, and has been endorsed by multiple ethicists and professional organizations”); Ros Sorensen et 
al., Health Care Professionals’ Views of Implementing a Policy of Open Disclosure of Errors, 13 J. 
HEALTH SERVICES RES. & POL’Y 227, 227 (2008) (finding that health professionals have positive 
views about open disclosure of medical errors); Andrew E. Thurman, Institutional Responses to 
Medical Mistakes: Ethical and Legal Perspectives, 11 KENNEDY INST. ETHICS J. 147, 155 (2001) 
(asserting that health-care “[p]roviders . . . have a legal and ethical duty to disclose . . . clinical 
consequences” of medical mistakes).  
 12. WACHTER & SHOJANIA, supra note 3, at 260–61. 
 13. Thomas H. Gallagher et al., National Survey: Risk Managers’ Attitudes and Experiences 
Regarding Patient Safety and Error Disclosure, 26 J. HEALTHCARE RISK MGMT. 11, 11 (2006). 
 14. MASSACHUSETTS COALITION FOR THE PREVENTION OF MEDICAL ERRORS, WHEN THINGS GO 
WRONG: RESPONDING TO ADVERSE EVENTS: A CONSENSUS STATEMENT OF THE HARVARD HOSPITALS 
(2006), http://www.ihi.org/IHI/Topics/PatientSafety/SafetyGeneral/Literature/WhenThingsGoWrong 
RespondingtoAdverseEvents.htm. 
 15. “The AMA’s Code of Ethics is widely disseminated and has provided the most commonly 
cited standard for courts, legislatures, administrative agencies, medical boards and other peer review 
entities. Most medical societies, and virtually all state medical societies, accept the code as the 
profession’s code.” ETHICS AND QUALITY OF CARE: REPORT OF THE AMERICAN MEDICAL 
ASSOCIATION AND THE FEDERATION OF STATE MEDICAL BOARDS 3 (1995), http://www.fsmb.org/pdf/ 
1995_grpol_Ethics_and_Quality_of_Care.pdf.  
https://openscholarship.wustl.edu/law_lawreview/vol86/iss5/3
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to know their past and present medical status and to be free of any 
mistaken beliefs concerning their conditions. Situations 
occasionally occur in which a patient suffers significant medical 
complications that may have resulted from the physician’s mistake 
or judgment. In these situations, the physician is ethically required 
to inform the patient of all the facts necessary to ensure 
understanding of what has occurred. Only through full disclosure is 
a patient able to make informed decisions regarding future medical 
care. . . . This obligation holds even though the patient’s medical 
treatment or therapeutic options may not be altered by the new 
information. Concern regarding legal liability which might result 
following truthful disclosure should not affect the physician’s 
honesty with a patient.16  
This directive shows that the medical profession generally embraces the 
responsibility of fully disclosing to patients the substance of any EMR. 
Moreover, the Chair of the AMA Board of Trustees, speaking to all AMA 
members, has urged doctors to respect the trust of their patients in them by 
speaking with patients “clearly” and “completely” about the issues that 
arise in the course of the physician-patient relationship.17 It is 
unacceptable18 for physicians to hide medical errors or other EMRs from 
patients under the AMA and other medical codes of ethics.19 
 
 
 16. AMERICAN MEDICAL ASSOCIATION COUNCIL ON ETHICAL AND JUDICIAL AFFAIRS, CODE OF 
MEDICAL ETHICS: CURRENT OPINIONS WITH ANNOTATIONS § 8.12 (2008) [hereinafter CODE OF 
MEDICAL ETHICS]. 
 17. Cecil B. Wilson, Trust: A Reciprocal Relationship Between Us and Patients, AMA Leader 
Commentary, AM. MED. NEWS, May 7, 2007, http://www.ama-assn.org/amednews/2007/05/07/ 
edca0507.htm (statement of the chair of the AMA Board of Trustees). 
 18. Violations of professional ethics may result in the state medical licensure board taking action 
against the noncompliant physician. Professional consequences range from mere reprimand to 
permanent loss of license. See Timothy Stoltzfus Jost, Oversight of the Quality of Medical Care: 
Regulation, Management, or the Market?, 37 ARIZ. L. REV. 825, 863 (1995).  
 19. Echoing the AMA’s position, the American College of Physicians has declared that 
“physicians should disclose to patients information about procedural and judgment errors made in the 
course of care, if such information significantly affects the care of the patient.” American College of 
Physicians, American College of Physicians Ethics Manual (3rd ed.), 117 ANNALS INTERNAL MED. 
947, 950 (1992). The principle established by the American College of Physicians is somewhat more 
narrow than that adopted by the American Medical Association in that disclosure is only required “if 
such information significantly affects the care of the patient.” Id. Similarly, the Ethics Manual of the 
Annals of Internal Medicine urges disclosing information “whenever it is considered material to the 
patient’s understanding of his or her situation, possible treatments, and probable outcomes,” including 
“information about procedural or judgment errors made in the course of care if such information is 
material to the patient’s well-being.” American College of Physicians, Ethics Manual: Fourth Edition, 
128 ANNALS INTERNAL MED. 576, 579 (1998), available at http://www.annals.org/cgi/content/full/ 
128/7/576. See also Lee Taft, Disclosing Unanticipated Outcomes: A Challenge to Providers and 
Their Lawyers, HEALTH LAW. NEWS, May 2008, at 11, 12 (“Disclosure has long been ethically 
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Hospitals, accreditation organizations, regulators, and legislators are 
also developing models of behavior to encourage physicians to discuss 
harmful errors with patients.20 For example, the Joint Commission,21 
which accredits various qualifying health-care entities, requires physicians 
to tell patients about unanticipated medical outcomes, including acts that 
are unintended or that fail to achieve their intended outcome.22 Further, 
health-care purchasers, various groups dedicated to improving health-care 
quality, and government agencies that fund health care have collaborated 
with the National Quality Forum (NQF), the leading government-advisory 
board on health-care quality, to develop a single set of thirty “safe 
practices” for hospitals, including the prompt disclosure of unanticipated 
medical outcomes to patients and their families.23 While compliance with 
these practices is voluntary,24 these safe practices are supported by entities 
that value health-care quality, including the Joint Commission, the 
Institute for Healthcare Improvement, the Agency for Healthcare Research 
and Quality, and the Centers for Medicare and Medicaid Services.25  
Paralleling this consensus, legislation has been enacted that imposes a 
statutory obligation to disclose on health-care providers. States that 
mandate reporting of adverse medical events include California, Colorado, 
Connecticut, Florida, Georgia, Illinois, Indiana, Kansas, Maine, Maryland, 
Massachusetts, Minnesota, Nevada, New Jersey, New York, Pennsylvania, 
Rhode Island, South Carolina, South Dakota, Tennessee, Texas, Utah, 
Vermont, and Washington.26 Most of these state laws mandating 
 
 
mandated by professional associations such as the American Medical Association (AMA), the 
American College of Physicians, and the American Nurses Association.”). 
 20. Thomas H. Gallagher et al., Disclosing Harmful Medical Errors to Patients, 356 NEW ENG. 
J. MED. 2713, 2713 (2007). See Taft, supra note 19, at 12 (“Disclosure is required by regulation, 
emerging standards, ethics, and, in some states, disclosure statutes.”). 
 21. Formerly known as the Joint Commission on Accreditation of Health Care Organizations. 
BARRY R. FURROW ET AL., LIABILITY AND QUALITY ISSUES IN HEALTH CARE 148 (6th ed. 2008). 
 22. REVISIONS TO JOINT COMMISSION STANDARDS IN SUPPORT OF PATIENT SAFETY AND 
MEDICAL HEALTH CARE ERROR REDUCTION (2001), available at http://www.dcha.org/ 
JCAHORevision.htm. Further, the Joint Commission also calls for hospitals to self-report any sentinel 
event, which is “an unexpected occurrence involving death or serious physical or psychological injury, 
or the risk thereof.” The Joint Commission, Sentinel Event Policy and Procedures (2007), 
http://www.jointcommission.org/SentinelEvents/PolicyandProcedures/se_pp.htm. 
 23. Laura Landro, Health-Care Industry Agrees on Set of Rules for Patient Safety, WALL ST. J., 
Nov. 1, 2006, at D1, available at http://online.wsj.com/article/SB116234626074809703.html?mod= 
djem_jiewr_hc; see also National Quality Forum, Safe Practices for Better Healthcare (2007), 
http://www.qualityforum.org/projects/completed/safe_practices/. 
 24. Gallagher et al., supra note 20, at 2715. While compliance is voluntary, the NQF system is 
linked to pay-for-performance standards. Id. 
 25. Id. at 2714. 
 26. National Academy for State Health Policy, Quality and Patient Safety: State Adverse Event 
Reporting Rules and Statutes, http://www.nashp.org/_docdisp_page.cfm?LID=2A789909-5310-11D6-
https://openscholarship.wustl.edu/law_lawreview/vol86/iss5/3
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disclosure direct these reports to independent administrative bodies. This 
external reporting requirement may lead to internal structural changes that 
improve health-care systems, but they provide little relief, assistance, or 
protection to affected patients. Just eight of these states—California, 
Florida, Maryland, Nevada, New Jersey, Pennsylvania, Vermont, and 
Washington—currently require disclosure of serious unanticipated 
medical outcomes to the patients.27 Further, only Pennsylvania provides 
specific sanctions for nondisclosure.28 Without mandating disclosures to 
patients and without imposing sanctions on health-care providers for a 
failure to disclose, such legislation is unlikely to ensure or even enhance 
the disclosure of emergent adverse medical risks to patients.29  
 
 
BCF000A0CC558925 (last visited Mar. 31. 2009) (Ohio and Oregon are also listed by the National 
Academy, but the National Academy notes that Ohio does not have specific reporting requirements for 
hospitals and reporting in Oregon is voluntary). Vermont is not included in the National Academy’s 
list, but its mandatory reporting requirement can be found at VT. STAT. ANN. tit. 18, § 1915 (2008). 
See also Cindy Skrzycki, Medicare Says ‘No’ to Bed Sores and Other Hospital Complications, WASH. 
POST, Oct. 21, 2008, at D02, available at http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-dyn/content/article/ 
2008/10/20/AR2008102002772.html (“About 20 states already require reporting of medical errors.”). 
For reflections on current reporting systems and suggestions for future reporting systems, see 
WACHTER & SHOJANIA, supra note 3, at 376–77; see also Berman, supra note 11, at 203–04. 
 27. CAL. HEALTH & SAFETY CODE § 1279.1(c) (West 2008) (“The facility shall inform the 
patient or the party responsible for the patient of the adverse event.”); FLA. STAT. ANN. § 395.0197 
(West 2006) (“(1) Every licensed facility shall . . . establish an internal risk management program that 
includes all of the following components: . . . (d) A system for informing a patient or [the patient’s 
proxy] that the patient was the subject of an adverse incident.”); MD. CODE REGS. 10.07.06.01 (2007) 
(“The purpose of this chapter is to provide a safe environment for patients by requiring hospitals to: 
. . . H. Provide a process to notify a patient or, if appropriate, a patient’s family, whenever an outcome 
of care differs significantly from an anticipated outcome.”); NEV. REV. STAT. ANN. § 439.855(2) 
(West 2008) (“A representative . . . shall, not later than 7 days after discovering or becoming aware of 
a sentinel event that occurred at the medical facility, provide notice of that fact to each patient who 
was involved in that sentinel event.”); N.J. STAT. ANN. § 26:2H-12.25(d) (West 2007) (“A health care 
facility shall assure that the patient affected by a serious preventable adverse event . . . , or, in the case 
of a minor or a patient who is incapacitated, the patient’s parent or guardian or other family member, 
as appropriate, is informed of the serious preventable adverse event.”); 40 PA. STAT. ANN. 
§ 1303.308(b) (West 2008) (“A medical facility . . . shall provide written notification to a patient 
affected by a serious event.”); VT. STAT. ANN. tit. 18, § 1915 (2008) (“The rules adopted pursuant to 
this chapter shall require hospitals to: (1) develop, maintain, and implement internal policies and 
procedures that meet the standards of the department to: . . . (D) disclose to patients, or, in the case of a 
patient death, an adult member of the immediate family, at a minimum, adverse events that cause death 
or serious bodily injury.”); WASH. REV. CODE ANN. § 70.41.380 (West 2008) (“Hospitals shall have in 
place policies to assure that, when appropriate, information about unanticipated outcomes is provided 
to patients or their families or any surrogate decision makers.”). See Gallagher et al., supra note 20, at 
2715; National Academy for State Health Policy, supra note 26; Taft, supra note 19, at 12 & 16 nn.9–
10. 
 28. Gallagher et al., supra note 20, at 2715. 
 29. For a discussion of proposed legislation that would have this effect and a call to enact this 
legislation, see Caroline Ann Forell & Anna Sortun, The Tort of Betrayal of Trust, 42 U. MICH. J.L. 
REFORM (forthcoming 2009). 
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Finally, patients strongly support efforts to enhance the disclosure of 
errors and other medical risks. In a study employing focus groups, all 
fifty-two participating patients voiced their desire for information on 
medical mistakes that affected them. These patients “unanimously wanted 
information regarding an error’s cause, consequences, and future 
prevention.”30 After reviewing the literature on communication with 
patients about medical errors, scholars have found that patients and 
families strongly support disclosure.31 Indeed, Florida voters enacted a 
state constitutional amendment that permits access to medical errors noted 
in their records.32 But doctors and hospitals may not have recorded these 
errors in patient files or may hesitate to disclose them,33 and the Florida 
amendment does not require physicians to disclose errors or other EMRs 
when they occur.  
Despite the strong desire of patients to know about medical errors and 
other EMRs that affect them, evidence shows that patients do not always 
receive this critical information.34 As the next Part discusses, the many 
ethical, regulatory, and legislative efforts seeking to increase disclosure 
have not solved the problem of undisclosed errors and other EMRs. 
 
 
 30. Gallagher et al., supra note 11, at 1006. See generally C. Wilkinson et al., Preferences of 
Acutely Ill Patients for Participation in Medical Decision-Making, 17 QUALITY & SAFETY HEALTH 
CARE 97, 98 (2008) (66% of 152 patients recently admitted to an acute care hospital “sought ‘very 
extensive’ or ‘a lot’ of information about their condition”). 
 31. Kathleen M. Mazor et al., Communicating with Patients About Medical Errors: A Review of 
the Literature, 164 ARCHIVES INTERNAL MED. 1690, 1692 (2004). 
 32. Under a Florida constitutional amendment, patients have a right to check records of past 
mistakes made by their doctors and hospitals. FLA. CONST. art. X, § 25(a). The Florida Supreme Court 
held that the “Patients’ Right to Know Amendment,” or Amendment 7, applied retroactively to give 
patients access to all past mistakes, not just those after the amendment passed in 2004. Florida Hosp. 
Waterman, Inc. v. Buster, 984 So. 2d 478 (Fla. 2008). However, a challenge to this amendment 
remains pending in the United States District Court for the Northern District of Florida. Florida Hosp. 
Ass’n v. Viamonte, No. 4:08cv312-RH/WCS, 2008 WL 5101755, at *1 (N.D. Fla. Nov. 26, 2008) 
(denying a motion to dismiss based on a series of procedural grounds). The challenge to the 
amendment was filed by the Florida Hospital Association and the Florida Medical Association, as well 
as individual hospitals and patients, who “assert that Amendment 7 violates the federal Constitution 
and is preempted by federal statutory provisions requiring the confidentiality of certain records.” Id.  
 33. For a discussion of reports from California regarding an inability to access patient records 
following an adverse medical event, despite a federal law (the Health Information Portability and 
Accountability Act) that establishes that every patient or the designated representative of the patient 
has the right to see and copy the patient’s medical record, see Robert Davis, Patients Often Struggle 
for Access to Medical Records, USA TODAY, Apr. 29, 2008, http://www.usatoday.com/news/health/ 
2008-04-29-medical-records_N.htm. 
 34. Gallagher et al., supra note 20, at 2713 (noting “a divide between [patient] expectations and 
actual clinical practice is increasingly evident”); Taft, supra note 19, at 13 (“[R]ecent data suggest that 
disclosure occurs only infrequently.”). 
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II. FAILURE TO DISCLOSE 
Despite a broad consensus that physicians have an obligation to tell 
patients about material risks that emerge during treatment, some 
physicians fail to do so. A survey of more than 1,600 physicians across a 
broad range of specialties found much agreement—but less action—on 
this ethical and increasingly legal obligation.35 This study determined that 
85% of the physicians believed that they needed to disclose all significant 
medical errors to patients or their guardians (93% agreed that physicians 
should report all significant medical errors to a hospital, clinic, or other 
authority).36 Despite the widespread professional agreement about the need 
for this disclosure, 46% of the physicians had failed to report at least one 
serious known medical error during their careers.37 These studies reveal 
the gap between agreed-upon norms regarding disclosure of an EMR and 
what sometimes happens in practice.38  
Likewise, one recent study found that nearly all of the physicians 
surveyed claimed that they would disclose medical errors to patients—
further showing a consensus has developed among physicians that 
disclosure should occur. Yet 19% of the responding physicians 
acknowledged that they had not disclosed a minor error (an error resulting 
in prolonged treatment or discomfort to a patient) and 4% admitted not 
disclosing a major error (an error resulting in disability or death).39  
Thomas Gallagher, a physician who has extensively surveyed patient 
and physician attitudes toward error disclosure, has also found that doctors 
support disclosing medical mistakes, but has likewise noted that practice 
does not always coincide with this widely held belief.40 In Gallagher’s 
study, which used focus groups, the forty-six participating doctors agreed 
on the principle that patients should be informed of all harmful errors, 
often characterizing disclosure as an ethical imperative.41 Yet some of 
these physicians admitted that they may hide an error that is not apparent 
 
 
 35. Eric G. Campbell et al., Professionalism in Medicine: Results of a National Survey of 
Physicians, 147 ANNALS INTERNAL MED. 795, 796–98 (2007). 
 36. Id. at 797. 
 37. Id. at 798. 
 38. Id. at 796–98. 
 39. Lauris C. Kaldjian et al., Disclosing Medical Errors to Patients: Attitudes and Practices of 
Physicians and Trainees, 22 J. GEN. INTERNAL MED. 988, 988 (2007) (reporting results of a survey of 
physicians and trainees across the country; of the 538 who responded—77% of those who received the 
survey—97% said they would disclose a hypothetical error resulting in minor harm to a patient and 
93% said they would disclose major harm to a patient). 
 40. Gallagher et al., supra note 11, at 1003–04. 
 41. Id. at 1003. 
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to patients, even when the error is serious,42 citing various rationales for 
avoiding disclosure, such as believing the patient would not want to know 
of the error.43  
Many concerns can place a doctor’s interests into conflict with those of 
the patient and potentially compromise the physician’s ultimate duty to 
promote the best interests of the patient.44 One reason that some physicians 
may ignore the prevailing wisdom calling for disclosure is that the 
disclosure can take a heavy emotional toll.45 Disclosing error—and 
admitting failure—is psychologically difficult for doctors who strive for 
perfection.46  
Time constraints may also limit communication between physicians 
and patients. In a society where the delivery of health care is dominated by 
managed care, physicians are encouraged to quickly process patients and 
not linger over issues that could increase costs by requiring additional time 
or resources.47 Although doctors are still expected to provide appropriate 
medical care within the assigned time constraints, they may find it easier 
to meet these constraints by avoiding difficult conversations.48 Further, 
doctors may not be reimbursed for costs tied to redressing some medical 
errors.49 
 
 
 42. Thomas H. Gallagher et al., Choosing Your Words Carefully: How Physicians Would 
Disclose Harmful Medical Errors to Patients, 166 ARCHIVES INTERNAL MED. 1585, 1591 (2006).  
 43. Id. But see Wilkinson et al., supra note 30, at 98.  
 44. See CODE OF MEDICAL ETHICS, supra note 16, at xxix, lxi (“III. A physician shall respect the 
law and also recognize a responsibility to seek changes in those requirements which are contrary to the 
best interests of the patient. . . . VIII. A physician shall, while caring for a patient, regard responsibility 
to the patient as paramount.”). Beyond the context addressed here, physicians in general have been 
recognized as having a duty to disclose all material conflicts of interest to their patients when 
obtaining informed consent for treatment. BARRY R. FURROW ET AL., HEALTH LAW 327–31 (2d ed. 
2000); see, e.g., Moore v. Regents of the Univ. of Cal., 793 P.2d 479 (Cal. 1990), cert. denied, 499 
U.S. 936 (1991) (requiring disclosure of financial conflicts of interest); see also Lori Andrews, 
Studying Medical Error In Situ: Implications for Malpractice Law and Policy, 54 DEPAUL L. REV. 
357, 376 (2005) (contending that if nondisclosure allows health-care providers to avoid lawsuits where 
they might be required to pay damages to a patient, then medical errors create a conflict of interest and 
the errors must be disclosed). 
 45. JOHN D. BANJA, MEDICAL ERRORS AND MEDICAL NARCISSISM ix (2005). 
 46. Cherri Hobgood et al., Profiles in Patient Safety: When an Error Occurs, 11 ACAD. 
EMERGENCY MED. 766, 768 (2004) (discussing the “ideal of error-free practice that permeates 
physician culture”). 
 47. See FURROW ET AL., supra note 44, at 340 (explaining that because “physicians feel 
increased pressure to see more patients, particularly in the managed care setting, full disclosure and 
open discussion is less likely to occur.”). 
 48. Thomas L. Hafemeister & Richard M. Gulbrandsen, Jr., The Fiduciary Obligation of 
Physicians to “Just Say No” if an “Informed” Patient Demands Services that Are Not Medically 
Indicated, 39 SETON HALL L. REV. 335, 358–60 (2009). 
 49. See, e.g., Maine Law Bans Hospitals from Charging for Treatment to Correct Medical 
Errors, 17 BNA’S HEALTH L. REP. 688, 688 (May 15, 2008) (“Under what is believed to be a first-in-
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Physicians may also feel that a full exploration and discussion of 
adverse medical events is better left to physician committees, hospital 
administrators, or external evaluators focused on improving health care in 
general.50 But while these groups may help provide information for 
valuable systemic changes, they do not give patients necessary 
information about their own medical condition.  
Most of all, physicians dread outraged patients and malpractice suits, 
cited by some doctors as “the single most powerful force” keeping errors 
in the shadows.51 Physicians fear possible lawsuits because they can result 
in high emotional and legal costs,52 an entry in the National Practitioner’s 
Data Bank,53 and suspension or revocation of a medical license.54 A 
lawsuit may lead to increased medical-malpractice premiums, if the 
physician is fortunate enough not to lose coverage entirely.55 In a field that 
 
 
the-nation law, hospitals in Maine beginning in July [of 2008] will be prohibited from charging for 
treatment to correct medical errors.”); Tom Murphy, WellPoint to Stop Select Reimbursements, INT’L 
BUS. TIMES, Apr. 2, 2008, available at http://www.ibtimes.com/ articles/20080402/wellpoint-to-stop-
select-reimbursements.htm (reporting that Medicare and health insurers like WellPoint, Inc. and Aetna 
are limiting payments for costs associated with some medical errors or other preventable injuries); 
Skrzycki, supra note 26 (“Regulators at the Centers for Medicare and Medicaid Services told about 
3,500 U.S. hospitals that as of Oct. 1, they won’t be reimbursed for . . . so-called ‘never events’ that 
patients should never acquire during a hospital stay. The dozen treatment areas on the list are 
considered ‘reasonably preventable’ and aren’t present when a patient checks in. . . . States and private 
insurers also have begun to ask for more reporting of errors.”).  
 50. See Campbell et al., supra note 35, at 797 (determining that although 85% of physicians 
believed they needed to disclose all significant medical errors to patients or their guardians, 93% 
believed they needed to report all significant medical errors to a hospital, clinic, or other authority). 
 51. WACHTER & SHOJANIA, supra note 3, at 296.  
 52. Although their legal costs and any judgment will typically be covered by their malpractice 
insurance, the anxiety and embarrassment associated with a public airing of their asserted deficient 
actions, the impingement on what may be their very busy schedule, and the distraction caused by an 
ongoing lawsuit are all significant deterrents for physicians. 
 53. Any entity (including an insurance company) that “makes payment under a policy of 
insurance, self-insurance, or otherwise in settlement (or partial settlement) of, or in satisfaction of a 
judgment in, a medical-malpractice action or claim,” must report “information respecting the payment 
and circumstances thereof” to the National Practitioner Data Bank (NPDB). 42 U.S.C. § 11131 (2000). 
The NPDB was established by Congress to provide an available repository of information pertaining to 
the professional competence or conduct of licensed professionals, with licensure boards and hospitals, 
but not the general public, having access to this information when checking on licensees and reviewing 
applications for staff privileges, respectively. FURROW ET AL., supra note 44, at 80–81. 
 54. See, e.g., U.S. DEPARTMENT OF HEALTH AND HUMAN SERVICES, STATE DISCIPLINE OF 
PHYSICIANS: ASSESSING STATE MEDICAL BOARDS THROUGH CASE STUDIES 28 (2006), http://aspe. 
hhs.gov/daltcp/reports/2006/stdiscp.pdf (charting sanctions used by state medical boards and 
documenting that all states permit their medical boards to suspend or revoke physician licenses).  
 55. Thomas H. Gallagher & Wendy Levinson, Disclosing Harmful Medical Errors to Patients: A 
Time for Professional Action, 165 ARCHIVES INTERNAL MED. 1819, 1819 (2005) (noting that 
physicians face skyrocketing medical-malpractice premiums and the possible loss of insurability after 
just one claim). But see FURROW ET AL., supra note 44, at 347 (“[Malpractice insurance rates for 
physicians] are typically determined based on the claims experience of the rating class rather than on 
the experience of the individual physician.”). 
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aspires to perfection, doctors legitimately worry that distributing 
information about their medical errors and medical-malpractice suits will 
jeopardize their reputations and careers.56 At the same time, one national 
study found that actual involvement in malpractice litigation did not 
diminish a physician’s later willingness to disclose,57 nor should it. 
Recently, medical scholars have promoted disclosure as good policy58 
that may actually reduce the risks of litigation.59 Research shows that poor 
communication between a physician and a patient often triggers lawsuits.60 
In contrast, candid disclosures and discussions can strengthen the bond 
between physicians and patients, defuse patient anger about perceived 
medical errors, and reduce the number of lawsuits.61 Patients agree that 
robust disclosure will “enhance their trust in their physicians’ honesty and 
. . . reassure them that they [a]re receiving complete information about 
 
 
 56. Kaldjian et al., supra note 39, at 994; see also Barron H. Lerner, In a Hospital Hierarchy, 
Speaking Up Is Hard to Do, N.Y. TIMES, Apr. 17, 2007, at F5, available at www.nytimes.com/2007/ 
04/17/health/17essa.html (reporting that medical students and residents often fear upsetting the 
hierarchy by reporting concerns, and that “[e]ven when students do speak up, they may be ignored”). 
 57. Kaldjian et al., supra note 39, at 994 (observing that physicians exposed to malpractice 
litigation were not less inclined to disclose errors). 
 58. Thurman, supra note 11, at 147.  
 59. See, e.g., Berman, supra note 11, at 200 (explaining that when patients are perceived as and 
encouraged to be active participants in medical decision making, a relationship of mutual respect and 
appreciation is more likely to ensue, which in turn helps disclosure seem more natural and decreases 
the chances of litigation); Kevin Sack, Doctors Start to Say “I’m Sorry” Before “See You in Court,” 
N.Y. TIMES, May 18, 2008, at A1, available at http://www.nytimes.com/2008/05/18/us/ 
18apology.html (“By promptly disclosing medical errors and offering earnest apologies and fair 
compensation, [prominent academic medical centers] hope to restore integrity to dealings with 
patients, make it easier to learn from mistakes and dilute anger that often fuels lawsuits.”). Legal 
commentators have made similar arguments. See Robin E. Ebert, Attorneys, Tell Your Clients to Say 
They’re Sorry: Apologies in the Health Care Industry, 5 IND. HEALTH L. REV. 337, 339 (2008) 
(“[C]ommunication between physicians and patients can help ease the tension of looming litigation.”); 
Jennifer K. Robbennolt, Apologies and Legal Settlement: An Empirical Examination, 102 MICH. L. 
REV. 460 (2003); Taft, supra note 19, at 15 (“In the wake of preventable error, lawyers [for health care 
providers] should consider . . . data that point to the short- and long-term economic benefits of 
disclosure. Lawyers should be aware of studies illustrating how disclosure identifies and invites 
correction of system errors . . . . Weighing the potential for disclosure to save lives and promote 
healing, and not just to generate monetary consequences, should be part of the process of advising 
healthcare clients on this issue.”). 
 60. See, e.g., Wendy Levinson et al., Physician-Patient Communication: The Relationship with 
Malpractice Claims Among Primary Care Physicians and Surgeons, 277 JAMA 553 (1997); Charles 
Vincent et al., Why Do People Sue Doctors? A Study of Patients and Relatives Taking Legal Action, 
343 LANCET 1609 (1994). 
 61. Darr, supra note 10, at 33 (asserting that patients who are treated fairly through full 
disclosure are less likely to sue, while hiding information from patients may incite their ire—and 
lawsuits); see also E. J. Mundell, Doctor-Patient Bond Frays After Medical Mistake, WASH. POST, 
Oct. 24, 2007, available at http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-dyn/content/article/2007/10/24/ 
AR2007102402044.html. 
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their overall care.”62 Some health-care systems that have adopted policies 
of full disclosure of medical errors and fair compensation to patients for 
medical errors have seen a decrease in medical-malpractice litigation.63 
III. THE NEED FOR A LEGAL DUTY TO DISCLOSE EMRS 
The ethical obligation to disclose EMRs to patients and its practical 
value have not convinced all physicians.64 Ethical codes are largely self-
policing; thus, physicians and hospitals may succumb to their fears of 
litigation and loss of professional status without facing any commensurate 
sanctions for failing to disclose.65 The standards issued by professional 
organizations also tend to promote systemic change to avoid future 
occurrences. While these efforts can dramatically improve health care, 
they tend not to ensure that useful—and sometimes vital—information is 
provided to individual patients about the risks they face.66  
As noted, the broad consensus that physicians should routinely disclose 
EMRs to patients tends to be cast in ethical rather than legal terms. With 
 
 
 62. Gallagher et al., supra note 11, at 1003. 
 63. See, e.g., Steve S. Kraman & Ginny Hamm, Risk Management: Extreme Honesty May Be the 
Best Policy, 131 ANNALS INTERNAL MED. 963 (1999) (describing the success of the Lexington 
Veterans Affairs [VA] Hospital’s error-disclosure and patient-compensation program); S. Hall, U-M 
Docs Say Sorry, Avert Suits, DETROIT NEWS, May 12, 2004, at 1C (describing the success of the 
University of Michigan Health System’s error-disclosure and patient-compensation program). 
 64. Nor are all scholars convinced that disclosure will have beneficial effects for physicians. 
Some scholars assert that error disclosure may increase the volume and costs of litigation. David M. 
Studdert et al., Disclosure of Medical Injury to Patients: An Improbable Risk Management Strategy, 
26 HEALTH AFF. 215, 222 (2007); see also Gallagher et al., supra note 20, at 2716 (advocating a duty 
to disclose despite the potential for more litigation). And, indeed, until a patient “discovers” the 
existence of a medical error, it is relatively unlikely that the patient will file a medical-malpractice suit. 
Furthermore, regardless of assurances that disclosure of medical error and an accompanying apology 
will reduce the likelihood of a lawsuit, the mere specter of a malpractice lawsuit, with its attendant 
report in the National Practitioner’s Database and other professional consequences, may lead some 
doctors to shun disclosure. But physicians can learn to share relevant information with patients in ways 
that help minimize the possibility of litigation. WACHTER & SHOJANIA, supra note 3, at 291 
(suggesting “straightforward apologies, prompt and fair settlement offers, family involvement, and 
highly visible institutional commitments to preventing similar errors in the future”). Moreover, the 
physician has a fiduciary duty to disclose to patients. See infra Part V. 
 65. Joan Vogel & Richard Delgado, To Tell the Truth: Physicians’ Duty to Disclose Medical 
Mistakes, 28 UCLA L. REV. 52, 55 (1980); see also id. at 58–60. 
 66. Only eight states require mandatory disclosure to the patient, rather than to an external 
organization. See supra note 27 and accompanying text; see also D. O. Farley et al., Adverse-Event-
Reporting Practices by US Hospitals: Results of a National Survey, 17 QUALITY & SAFETY HEALTH 
CARE 416, 416 (2008) (finding that more than 94% of 1,652 responding hospitals from across the 
country have central systems for reporting and collecting data on adverse events, but only a third have 
established environments that support reporting, only “20–21% fully distribute and consider summary 
reports [of adverse] events,” and “only 13% have broad staff involvement in reporting adverse events,” 
with physicians appearing to be particularly averse to reporting errors). 
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the medical profession now recognizing the importance and value of these 
disclosures, defining a legal duty to disclose EMRs is both timely and 
appropriate.67 
A defined legal duty sends a clear message that physicians must not 
succumb to the fears that may breed silence among some physicians. A 
legal duty to disclose gives physicians a tangible, concrete requirement 
that undercuts any rationalizing of a need for concealment. If the law 
requires physicians to disclose EMRs to patients or face legal sanctions for 
a failure to do so, doctors will have a significant incentive to disclose that 
can counterbalance these fears. Because staying quiet can provide grounds 
for a lawsuit, physicians will be motivated to adhere to the consensus 
reached by their peers.68 Moreover, while physicians accused of medical 
error will be vindicated if they adhered to the professional standard of 
care, physicians who fail to adequately disclose an EMR will have no such 
defense available to them.69 The relevant issue will be a relatively 
straightforward question of whether an EMR was discovered by the 
physician in the course of treatment and whether the requisite disclosure 
occurred. Although some doctors may gamble that their patients will never 
learn of the emergent risk, the prospect of paying damages for a failure to 
disclose may shift the balance of their risk-benefit analysis, providing 
these physicians with a greater incentive to disclose.  
Establishing a legal duty to disclose emergent medical risks will also 
convey a strong symbolic message to the medical profession.70 A legal 
duty can animate ethical values such as a physician’s obligation to disclose 
EMRs and a patient’s right to know of these risks.71 Although the law 
often draws on behavioral norms when articulating legal duties, the law 
can also independently affect behavior when imposing liability for certain 
activities.72 Thus, physicians may take the duty to disclose more seriously 
 
 
 67. See Gallagher et al., supra note 20, at 2713 (asserting that “[e]xternal pressures for 
disclosure, coupled with some thawing of reluctance within the medical profession, have created an 
environment that is ripe for change”). 
 68. See Vogel & Delgado, supra note 65, at 60–61 (contending that a legal duty lessens some 
professional risks to physicians because “physicians could explain to colleagues and superiors that 
they were merely complying with the law in disclosing malpractice”). 
 69. See American College of Physicians, Ethics and Human Rights Committee, Ethics Manual: 
Fourth Edition, Disclosure, 128 ANNALS INTERNAL MED. 576 (1998), available at http://www.annals. 
org/cgi/content/full/128/7/576 (observing that while medical errors are not necessarily unethical, 
failure to disclose them may be). What constitutes an “adequate” disclosure under the circumstances 
will be addressed infra, Part VI. 
 70. See Vogel & Delgado, supra note 65, at 88. 
 71. See CODE OF MEDICAL ETHICS, supra note 16, § 8.12. 
 72. See Charles D. Siegal, Rule Formation in Non-Hierarchical Systems, 16 TEMP. ENVTL. L. & 
TECH. J. 173, 174 (1998) (“[S]ome rules, while not generally controlling all or most behavior, do 
https://openscholarship.wustl.edu/law_lawreview/vol86/iss5/3
 
 
 
 
 
 
2009] LEAN ON ME 1183 
 
 
 
 
when it is freighted with legal consequences. Similarly, as scholars have 
noted, “many physicians are idealistic, law-abiding citizens for whom a 
legal duty to disclose . . . would make a difference.”73 Any reluctance to 
disclose may be outweighed by reinforcing the ethical principle that 
physicians must act in accord with their position of trust by sharing 
information of EMRs with their patients.  
Moreover, appropriate consequences should flow from the breach of a 
responsibility that places patients directly at risk. Dr. Lucian Leape, who is 
widely perceived as the founder of America’s patient-safety movement, 
argues that when doctors fail to meet professional standards, “something 
has to happen. Today, nothing does, and you have a vicious cycle in which 
people have no real incentive to follow the rules because they know there 
are no consequences if they don’t.”74 While doctors confront the prospect 
of sanctions from medical licensure boards and the possibility of being 
required to pay damages following a malpractice suit if medical error is 
discovered, the nondisclosure of an EMR by a physician should also result 
in specific and substantial consequences. Physicians generally agree that 
they should be personally responsible for the well-being of their patients 
because a “lack of accountability . . . does harm patient safety.”75 Without 
a legal duty to disclose EMRs to patients and associated penalties, some 
doctors may continue to fail to disclose this important and often vital 
information to their patients.  
A significant body of jurisprudence shows that courts have established 
a legal vehicle to mandate this disclosure: the fiduciary duty that 
physicians owe to their patients.76 Especially when existing state law does 
not mandate this disclosure, and thus fails to provide adequate protection 
to patients, courts can apply this well-established judicial doctrine to 
remedy the failure to disclose an EMR.77  
 
 
influence some decisions; others may be ripening into norms in the traditional sense.”); Peter Tiersma, 
The Language of Silence, 48 RUTGERS L. REV. 1, 41–42 (1995) (describing the courts’ use of 
behavioral norms to establish legal duties). 
 73. Vogel & Delgado, supra note 65, at 86. 
 74. WACHTER & SHOJANIA, supra note 3, at 321 (quoting Wachter and Shojania’s interview with 
Dr. Lucian Leape, described by the authors as “the legendary surgeon who sounded the first alarms 
about medical errors back when few people were willing to listen”). 
 75. Id. at 380. 
 76. Id. 
 77. Id. 
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IV. THE NATURE OF THE PHYSICIAN-PATIENT RELATIONSHIP 
An exploration of the physician-patient relationship lays the 
philosophical groundwork of a physician’s duty to disclose EMRs. 
Underlying the relationship between patients and physicians are the 
bioethical principles of nonmaleficence, beneficence, autonomy, and 
justice.78  
The basic tenet “first, do no harm” encapsulates the idea of 
nonmaleficence. Physicians have an ethical obligation to avoid injuring 
patients.79 If a doctor fails to provide a patient with complete information 
about the patient’s medical condition, negative outcomes that the patient 
could have avoided may occur.80 Further, if a patient has been injured by a 
medical error, disclosure of this occurrence is part of the physician’s duty 
to help prevent future harm from occurring.81 To avoid doing harm, all 
EMRs—not just errors—need to be brought to the patient’s attention, 
enabling the patient to monitor these risks and bring any materialized 
symptoms or harms to the attention of a physician.  
The principle of beneficence recognizes that physicians have an 
affirmative obligation to help their patients “by doing what is best for 
them”82 and admonishes doctors who place their own interests over their 
patients’ needs.83 A beneficent physician offers full explanations of a 
patient’s medical condition to a patient because providing that 
information, in and of itself, enables the patient to understand the existing 
medical circumstances and make related decisions.84 While a physician 
may be tempted to withhold information that could trigger a medical-
malpractice lawsuit, the principle of beneficence instead directs a 
physician to act in the patient’s best interests. EMRs should be disclosed 
because that information may benefit the patient. 
 
 
 78. Albert W. Wu et al., To Tell the Truth: Ethical and Practical Issues in Disclosing Medical 
Mistakes to Patients, 12 J. GEN. INTERNAL MED. 770, 772 (1997); see also Kimberly G. Crone et al., 
Between a Rock and a Hard Place: Disclosing Medical Errors, 52 CLINICAL CHEMISTRY 1809, 1810 
(2006); Joan Gibson, Thinking About the “Ethics” in Bioethics, in BIOETHICS: HEALTH CARE LAW 
AND ETHICS 4–5 (Barry Furrow et al. eds., 5th ed. 2004). 
 79. Wu et al., supra note 78, at 772. 
 80. Crone et al., supra note 78, at 1811. 
 81. Id. 
 82. Gibson, supra note 78, at 4 (“3. Beneficence. The principle that one has a duty to help others 
by doing what is best for them.”). 
 83. Wu et al., supra note 78, at 772. 
 84. Crone et al., supra note 78, at 1810; see also WACHTER & SHOJANIA, supra note 3, at 291 
(urging full disclosure because “professional ethics demand nothing less than candor”). 
https://openscholarship.wustl.edu/law_lawreview/vol86/iss5/3
 
 
 
 
 
 
2009] LEAN ON ME 1185 
 
 
 
 
The next bioethical tenet related to the physician-patient relationship is 
that patients are free to make their own decisions about their health-care 
treatment.85 The principle of patient autonomy has been widely 
embraced.86 As Justice Cardozo wrote, “[e]very human being of adult 
years and sound mind has a right to determine what shall be done with his 
own body.”87 This principle has also shaped the contemporary doctrine of 
informed consent, giving patients the ultimate authority to decide the 
course of their medical treatment.88 Consent to medical treatment cannot 
be “informed” unless the physician has disclosed to the patient the 
material risks and benefits associated with a proposed treatment and 
reasonable alternatives to that treatment.89 Likewise, patients deserve and 
need to have physicians tell them about medical risks that emerge over the 
course of treatment, thereby enabling patients to chart and monitor their 
future medical care. If unaware of these EMRs, patients may not fully 
grasp the implications of future medical treatment and may fail to make 
appropriate related medical decisions.90 Disclosure may also enable 
patients to rid themselves of mistaken beliefs about their medical 
condition. For example, without disclosure patients may disregard pain 
they are currently experiencing because they believe that they were 
“successfully” treated for a given condition. Even if future health-care 
decisions are not at stake, “patients have a claim to know their own history 
and to be free of mistaken beliefs concerning their past, present, or future 
medical condition.”91 The principle of autonomy guarantees patients the 
right to know medical information that concerns their own bodies. 
Justice—another bioethical principle associated with the physician- 
patient relationship—calls for giving patients services to which they are or 
 
 
 85. Crone et al., supra note 78, at 1810. 
 86. The American Medical Association’s Code of Medical Ethics declares that “[t]he principle of 
patient autonomy holds that an individual’s physical, emotional, and psychological integrity should be 
respected and upheld. This principle also recognizes the human capacity to self-govern and choose a 
course of action from among different alternative options.” CODE OF MEDICAL ETHICS, supra note 16, 
§ 10.02. 
 87. Schloendorff v. Soc’y of New York Hosp., 105 N.E. 92, 93 (N.Y. 1914). 
 88. See Marshall B. Kapp, Patient Autonomy in the Age of Consumer-Driven Health Care: 
Informed Consent and Informed Choice, 28 J. LEGAL MED. 91, 117 (2007). 
 89. See Canterbury v. Spence, 464 F.2d 772, 782–83 (D.C. Cir. 1972). 
 90. Crone et al., supra note 78, at 1810; see also Thurman, supra note 11, at 150. Some may 
claim that patients cannot grasp the technicalities of medicine, but settled law and ethics view patients 
as capable of making informed medical decisions. Kapp, supra note 88, at 98–99 (contending that 
despite the doubts of some scholars, informed consent is an attainable goal). Patient decision-making 
capacity is generally presumed by the courts, unless incapacity is shown. FURROW ET AL., supra note 
44, at 340. 
 91. Wu et al., supra note 78, at 772. 
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should be entitled.92 A quid pro quo exists between the patient and 
physician. For example, if a doctor receives payment to provide medical 
care to a patient, the physician must provide that care. Similarly, most 
members of the medical profession agree that a just physician who has 
committed medical error should provide the patient with an explanation, 
an apology, or an offer of compensation.93 It is unjust to leave a patient at 
risk of harm when the physician knows information that will help the 
patient avoid or minimize that risk. In these circumstances, patients 
deserve candid disclosure of EMRs from their physicians.94  
These bioethical principles of nonmaleficence, beneficence, autonomy, 
and justice support a physician’s duty to give patients information about 
EMRs. The unique relationship between physicians and patients, however, 
gives rise not only to bioethical principles, but also to fiduciary duties.  
V. THE FIDUCIARY DUTY TO DISCLOSE 
The nature of the physician-patient relationship creates special 
responsibilities for doctors. Because physicians have superior medical 
knowledge and skill and are the gatekeepers to medical services, patients 
are dependent on them.95 Patients lack the knowledge or skill to assess 
their own health conditions. Instead, they must depend on their physicians 
to provide critical information about their medical well-being. Patients 
rely on doctors to assist and direct them in choosing necessary medical 
treatment. As noted in Canterbury v. Spence,96 the now-classic case 
establishing that patients have a right to exercise informed consent before 
treatment begins, patients are almost totally dependent on doctors for 
medical information, with few reliable alternatives.97 This dependence is 
enhanced by the anxiety that patients typically feel about their health, the 
vulnerability that they experience from a sickness or injury, and the 
challenge of finding a new doctor if a patient concludes that the present 
 
 
 92. See Gibson, supra note 82, at 4 (“5. Distributive Justice. The principle that benefits and 
burdens ought to be distributed equitably, that resources (especially scarce resources) ought to be 
allocated fairly, and that one ought to act in such a manner that no one person or group bears a 
disproportionate share of benefits or burdens.”). 
 93. Crone et al., supra note 78, at 1811; see also Wu et al., supra note 78, at 772–73 (contending 
that justice requires compensating patients who were seriously harmed by medical error). 
 94. See, e.g., BANJA, supra note 45, at ix (urging disclosure to respect “the patient’s right to the 
unvarnished truth about what happened”). 
 95. FURROW ET AL., supra note 44, at 327. 
 96. 464 F.2d 722 (D.C. Cir. 1972). 
 97. Id. at 782; see Hafemeister & Gulbrandsen, supra note 48, at 370–73. 
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doctor is providing inadequate services.98 Because patients are so 
vulnerable and dependent on their physicians, the law imposes a “trust” on 
doctors—a fiduciary responsibility stemming from the dependence and 
vulnerability of the patient, and from the disparity between a patient’s and 
a physician’s knowledge and ability to act.99  
Fiduciary duties have deep roots in the common law. Within the law 
governing the administration of trusts—where a trustee has been appointed 
to administer a corpus or an estate on behalf of a beneficiary—courts 
developed the concept of fiduciary duty.100 Originally an equitable remedy 
to correct the harm done by a disloyal trustee, fiduciary duties now apply 
to many relationships in which a party is entrusted with the welfare of 
someone who is relatively vulnerable.101 Typically, fiduciaries possess 
specialized knowledge102 and can deliver needed services that are not 
routinely available.103 Fiduciary relationships arise when one party is 
justified in expecting loyal conduct from another.104 Courts have 
recognized fiduciary relationships between attorneys and clients, guardians 
and wards, financial advisors and clients, and corporate officers and 
shareholders.105 Among other things, fiduciaries are charged with a duty of 
loyalty106 and must promote the beneficiary’s interest over the fiduciary’s 
own.107 The duty of loyalty provides a check on the potential abuse of 
power by the fiduciary, who is in a predominant position with regard to 
the beneficiary.108  
 
 
 98. Hafemeister & Gulbrandsen, supra note 48, at 370–73. 
 99. FURROW ET AL., supra note 44, at 327. See generally Thomas L. Hafemeister & Sarah P. 
Bryan, Beware Those Bearing Gifts: Physicians’ Fiduciary Duty to Avoid Pharmaceutical Marketing, 
57 U. KAN. L. REV. 491, 519–28 (2009) (providing general overview and discussion of a physicians’ 
fiduciary duty to a patient); Hafemeister & Gulbrandsen, supra note 48, at 367–78 (providing general 
overview and discussion of a physicians’ fiduciary duty to a patient); Charity Scott, Doctors as 
Advocates, Lawyers as Healers, 29 HAMLINE J. PUB. L. & POL’Y 331, 337 (2008) (“This concept of 
the physician as fiduciary has become well accepted in both U.S. law and the ethical tenets of 
American professional medical associations.”). 
 100. Andrew Grubb, The Doctor as Fiduciary, 47 CURRENT LEGAL PROBS. 311, 311 (1994). 
 101. Maxwell J. Mehlman, Dishonest Medical Mistakes, 59 VAND. L. REV. 1137, 1147 (2006). 
 102. Marc A. Rodwin, Strains in the Fiduciary Metaphor: Divided Physician Loyalties and 
Obligations in a Changing Health Care System, 21 AM. J.L. & MED. 241, 244 (1995). 
 103. Tamar Frankel, Fiduciary Law, 71 CAL. L. REV. 795, 800 (1983). 
 104. Deborah A. DeMott, Breach of Fiduciary Duty: On Justifiable Expectations of Loyalty and 
Their Consequences, 48 ARIZ. L. REV. 925, 936 (2006). 
 105. Rodwin, supra note 102, at 243. 
 106. Id. at 244; see also Meinhard v. Salmon, 164 N.E. 545, 546 (N.Y. 1928) (charging fiduciaries 
with the duty of “undivided loyalty”). 
 107. 2 DAN B. DOBBS, THE LAW OF TORTS 1392–93 (2001); see also Rodwin, supra note 102, at 
244. 
 108. Austin W. Scott, The Fiduciary Principle, 37 CAL. L. REV. 539, 541 (1949); Frankel, supra 
note 103, at 826; see also Mehlman, supra note 101, at 1147 n.44.  
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Courts have similarly recognized the fiduciary nature of the physician-
patient relationship. Because patients generally seek the services of a 
physician when they are sick, injured, or concerned about their health, 
because doctors have unique access to a patient’s medical information and 
superior insight into a patient’s medical condition, and because physicians 
control patients’ ability to obtain needed medical treatment, patients are 
highly dependent on their physicians and should be able to rely on their 
physicians to protect and promote their well-being.109 For these reasons, 
the judiciary has routinely found a fiduciary relationship to exist between 
physicians and patients.110 As one court noted, “[t]here can be little dispute 
that a doctor occupies a condition of trust and confidence, a fiduciary 
relationship with [the] patient.”111 The medical profession acknowledges 
the physician’s fiduciary duty in the AMA’s Code of Ethics by stating 
“[t]he relationship between patient and physician is based on trust and 
gives rise to physicians’ ethical obligations to place patients’ welfare 
above their own self-interest.”112 The fiduciary’s duty of loyalty is 
designed to ensure that the beneficiary can fully rely on the fiduciary to 
protect and promote the beneficiary’s interests.113  
Generally, fiduciaries have a duty to disclose to competent 
beneficiaries114 any information relevant to fulfilling their fiduciary 
obligations.115 The scope of the required communications vary somewhat, 
 
 
 109. See Washington v. Glucksberg, 521 U.S. 702, 731 (1997) (noting that “trust . . . is essential to 
the doctor-patient relationship”). 
 110. See, e.g., Hahn v. Mirda, 54 Cal. Rptr. 3d 527, 532 (Ct. App. 2007); Tresemer v. Barke, 150 
Cal. Rptr. 384, 394 (Ct. App. 1978); Wohlgemuth v. Meyer, 293 P.2d 816, 820 (Cal. Dist. Ct. App. 
1956); Mangoni v. Temkin, 679 So. 2d 1286, 1288 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1996); Schmucking v. Mayo, 
235 N.W. 633, 633 (Minn. 1931); Tracy v. Merrell Dow Pharm., 569 N.E.2d 875, 878 (Ohio 1991); 
Borderlon v. Peck, 661 S.W.2d 907, 908 (Tex. 1983); Carson v. Fine, 867 P.2d 610, 617–18 (Wash. 
1994). Some courts have refused to extend a fiduciary framework to relationships that do not involve 
property, even when they exhibit all the classic indications of a fiduciary duty. Grubb, supra note 100, 
at 314. Arguably, these courts could view the patient’s body as the “property” required to establish a 
fiduciary duty.  
 111. Taber v. Riordan, 403 N.E.2d 1349, 1353 (Ill. App. Ct. 1980).  
 112. CODE OF MEDICAL ETHICS, supra note 16, § 10.015. 
 113. William M. Barron & Mark G. Kuczewski, Unanticipated Harm to Patients: Deciding When 
to Disclose Outcomes, 29 JOINT COMMISSION J. QUALITY & SAFETY 551, 552 (2003). 
 114. Historically, full and open discussion was not expected when the beneficiary was 
incompetent, such as when the beneficiary was a minor or the subject of a guardianship or 
conservatorship. The underlying rationale was that these beneficiaries would not benefit from or 
meaningfully contribute to these discussions. Recently, however, it has been increasingly recognized 
that, to the extent possible, even these beneficiaries should be kept abreast of relevant activities by the 
fiduciary. See Sheryl L. Buske, Foster Children and Pediatric Clinical Trials: Access Without 
Protection Is Not Enough, 14 VA. J. SOC. POL’Y & L. 253, 281–87 (2007) (explaining that children’s 
assent is generally required before pediatric treatment or research can commence and that this assent 
must follow an age-appropriate exchange of information regarding the treatment or research).  
 115. Andrews, supra note 44, at 373–74. 
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depending on the nature of the fiduciary relationship.116 Although many 
aspects of a physician’s fiduciary duties have not been fully fleshed out by 
the courts,117 the duty to disclose EMRs fits squarely within existing legal 
doctrine.  
Legal precedent supports the existence of a duty to disclose that is 
generally rooted in the fiduciary relationship between physicians and 
patients.118 Many cases have considered nondisclosure of medical error, 
for example, to constitute misrepresentation or fraud, often using this as a 
basis for tolling the statute of limitations that governs the filing of 
medical-malpractice claims.119 In addition, a failure to disclose an EMR to 
a patient—at least one involving an undisclosed medical error—has been 
the basis for directly imposing liability on a physician. Some courts have 
characterized a failure to disclose as misrepresentation by silence.120 
Deliberate nondisclosure has also been categorized as fraudulent 
concealment.121 In these cases, the failure to disclose is usually 
subordinated to a medical-malpractice claim, rather than standing alone as 
an independent cause of action.  
Judicial rulings have also specifically indicated that a physician has a 
fiduciary duty to reveal EMRs to patients. These cases state that doctors 
have a fiduciary obligation to disclose to a patient whenever they become 
aware of adverse medical information about a patient’s condition. A recent 
 
 
 116. See Mary Anne Bobinski, Autonomy and Privacy: Protecting Patients from Their Physicians, 
55 U. PITT. L. REV. 291, 348–52; cf. Marshall B. Kapp, Medical Error Versus Malpractice, 1 DEPAUL 
J. HEALTH CARE L. 751, 762 (1997) (“[L]iability may be imposed on a physician specifically because 
that professional failed to reveal relevant information—i.e., the occurrence of the medical error—to 
the patient. The cause of action here could be based on the physician’s violation of fiduciary 
responsibilities, which encompass obligations to disclose the nature and scope of negligently caused 
injuries.”). 
 117. Mehlman, supra note 101, at 1172. 
 118. Theodore R. LeBlang & Jane L. King, Tort Liability for Nondisclosure: The Physician’s 
Legal Obligations to Disclose Patient Illness and Injury, 89 DICK. L. REV. 1, 36 (1984). 
 119. See, e.g., Harrison v. United States, 708 F.2d 1023, 1028 (5th Cir. 1983); Pedersen v. Zielski, 
822 P.2d 903, 908 (Alaska 1991); Walk v. Ring, 44 P.3d 990, 999 (Ariz. 2002); Brown v. Bleiberg, 32 
Cal. 3d 426, 439 (1982); Tresemer v. Barke, 150 Cal. Rptr. 384, 394 (Ct. App. 1978); Harvey v. Davis, 
432 So. 2d 1203, 1204 (La. Ct. App. 1983); Schmucking v. Mayo, 235 N.W. 633, 634 (Minn. 1931); 
Reyes v. Anka Research, Ltd., 443 N.Y.S.2d 595, 597 (Sup. Ct. 1981); Borderlon v. Peck, 661 S.W.2d 
907, 908 (Tex. 1983); see also Andrews, supra note 44, at 376; LeBlang & King, supra note 118, at 
36–37. 
 120. See, e.g., Stafford v. Shultz, 270 P.2d 1, 7 (Cal. 1954); Wohlgemuth v. Meyer, 293 P.2d 816, 
820 (Cal. Ct. App. 1956); Adams v. Ison, 249 S.W.2d 791, 794 (Ky. Ct. App. 1952); Lopez v. Swyer, 
279 A.2d 116, 124 (N.J. Super. Ct. App. Div. 1971), modified, 300 A.2d 563 (N.J. 1973). 
 121. Bohus v. Beloff, 950 F.2d 919, 926 (3d Cir. 1991); Roberts v. Francis, 128 F.3d 647, 650 
(8th Cir. 1997); Morrison v. Acton, 198 P.2d 590, 595 (Ariz. 1948); Garcia v. Presbyterian Hosp. Ctr., 
593 P.2d 487, 490 (N.M. Ct. App. 1979); Earle v. Ratliff, 998 S.W.2d 882, 888 (Tex. 1999); Farmers’ 
State Bank of Newport v. Lamon, 231 P. 952, 953 (Wash. 1925).  
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California case involved a patient who went through chemotherapy and a 
radical mastectomy, but who was not told that her cancer diagnosis was in 
error.122 The court asserted that, as a fiduciary, “the physician is prohibited 
from misrepresenting the nature of the patient’s medical condition.”123 
Similarly, the Eighth Circuit held that a physician violated his fiduciary 
duty by failing to inform his patient that he had removed her only 
remaining ovary during a bladder operation.124 Because of the fiduciary 
relationship, the Fifth Circuit has also required doctors to disclose known 
facts about a patient’s adverse conditions, including “a cause [of the 
adverse condition] known by the doctor or discoverable by him through 
efficient diagnosis.”125 In that case, a child’s parents were not told about 
the medical procedure that may have left their infant blind, comatose, and 
irreversibly brain damaged.126 
Courts have drawn heavily on the previously discussed bioethical tenet 
of patient autonomy to support a physician’s fiduciary duty to disclose to 
patients. For example, one court declared that each patient “has the right to 
chart his own destiny, and the doctor must supply the patient with the 
material facts the patient will need in order to intelligently chart that 
destiny.”127 The principle of autonomy has special relevance for cases of 
medical error. Indeed, one court found it “unthinkable” that a physician 
could withhold information if “the patient was deprived of an opportunity 
for escape from a medical predicament which the physician by his own 
negligence had initially inflicted on the patient.”128 A physician is usually 
the best—and often the only—means to avoid harm when a risk is 
discovered during the course of unrelated treatment. As courts place a high 
value on information that affects a patient’s autonomy, a physician must 
disclose all EMRs discovered in the course of treatment. One court stated 
that a doctor has a fiduciary duty to tell the patient all information 
 
 
 122. Hahn v. Mirda, 54 Cal. Rptr. 3d 527, 532 (Ct. App. 2007). 
 123. Id. 
 124. Roberts, 128 F.3d at 650. 
 125. Nardone v. Reynolds, 538 F.2d 1131, 1135 (5th Cir. 1976). 
 126. See Nardone v. Reynolds, 333 So. 2d 25, 28–29 (Fla. 1976) (providing factual background 
for Nardone, 538 F.2d at 1133). 
 127. Nixdorf v. Hicken, 612 P.2d 348, 354 n.19 (Utah 1980) (quoting Miller v. Kennedy, 522 P.2d 
852, 860 (Wash. Ct. App. 1974), aff’d, 530 P.2d 334 (Wash. 1975)); see also Gates v. Jensen, 595 P.2d 
919, 923 (Wash. 1979) (asserting that the physician must disclose all facts that “the patient needs in 
order to make the decision. To require less would be to deprive the patient of the capacity to choose 
the course his or her life will take”).  
 128. Simcuski v. Saeli, 377 N.E.2d 713, 719 (N.Y. 1978). 
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necessary for the patient to make informed decisions for future medical 
treatment.129 
It is also worth noting that a physician’s fiduciary duty to disclose 
emergent adverse medical risks may extend beyond the termination of the 
physician-patient relationship. Courts have recognized that the timing of 
the emergent adverse medical condition does not mitigate the duty to 
disclose when the physician learns of information indicating that the 
patient’s medical well-being is at significant risk.130 Because of the 
potential gravity of medical information to patient health, the Fifth Circuit 
declared that the duty to disclose continues even after the physician-patient 
relationship has ended.131 As legal scholars have noted, “[w]hen a patient 
may be harmed because of prior treatment or when new information of 
critical importance is available concerning past care, a physician has a 
duty to reasonably notify those affected individuals. Only through such 
efforts can the physician fulfill the fiduciary responsibilities [created by] 
the physician-patient relationship.”132 For example, one court recognized 
the existence of a cause of action when a physician failed to warn his 
former patient of the dangerous effects of the Dalkon Shield (an 
intrauterine device) after obtaining knowledge of these hazards.133 
Similarly, when a type of dye injected into patients was later discovered to 
be dangerous, the physicians who performed these injections were held to 
have a duty to seek out former patients and to disclose “that in the 
supposedly innocent treatment there had now been found to lurk the risk 
of devastating injury.”134  
By requiring physicians to seek out former patients to disclose newly 
discovered medical risks, these decisions emphasize that physicians have a 
relatively extensive affirmative obligation linked to their fiduciary duties 
to their patients—one that does not automatically cease when the 
physician-patient relationship ends and that does not depend on a patient 
 
 
 129. Hahn v. Mirda, 54 Cal. Rptr. 3d 527, 532 (Ct. App. 2007). 
 130. See, e.g., Mink v. Univ. of Chicago, 460 F. Supp. 713, 720 (N.D. Ill. 1978); Schwartz v. 
United States, 230 F. Supp. 536, 540 (E.D. Pa. 1964). 
 131. Nardone v. Reynolds, 538 F.2d 1131, 1136 (5th Cir. 1976).  
 132. LeBlang & King, supra note 118, at 30. 
 133. Tresemer v. Barke, 150 Cal. Rptr. 384, 394 (Ct. App. 1978). 
 134. Schwartz, 230 F. Supp. at 540; see also Mink, 460 F. Supp. at 720 (finding that researchers 
who gave diethylstilbestrol (DES) to participants in a medical experiment had a duty to disclose a link 
between DES and cancer, even though that link was not known until after the experiment; the court 
explained that “[t]he fact the knowledge of the risk was obtained after the patient was treated does not 
alter the obligation. If the defendant fails to notify the patient when the risk becomes known, he has 
breached this duty.”).  
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requesting this information.135 In light of the constantly evolving nature of 
medical knowledge and the general mobility of patients, however, it is 
likely that courts would limit the duty of disclosure to EMRs that surface 
in the course of the physician-patient relationship or in a reasonable period 
of time after that relationship ceases. 
VI. WHEN AND WHAT TO DISCLOSE 
Beyond recognizing a duty to disclose EMRs, some courts have 
sketched parameters about the scope of the obligation. Generally, where 
recognized, the duty to disclose appears to be triggered as soon as the 
physician learns of the EMR, requiring the physician to share relevant 
information with the patient as soon as practicable.136  
In the words of the Fifth Circuit, the fiduciary relationship imposes on 
physicians the duty to disclose “known facts,” such as the discovery of an 
adverse condition afflicting a patient.137 At least one court, however, has 
stated that a physician must disclose “those facts the physician knows or 
should know which the patient needs in order to make the decision.”138 
This ruling suggests that the test of the adequacy of the disclosure is what 
a reasonable physician would disclose with the same information about the 
patient’s medical condition and the emergent risk. Another court has 
indicated, however, that the test should be comparable to the “reasonable 
patient” test that a number of courts have adopted for determining whether 
a patient gave informed consent to medical treatment.139 The latter 
 
 
 135. LeBlang & King, supra note 118, at 30 (concluding from case law that the duty to disclose 
“is not triggered by specific patient questions but rather exists independent of any such inquiry,” 
meaning that “[t]he physician must initiate the communication of pertinent information to the patient 
or risk liability for failing to comply with a recognized duty within the framework of the physician-
patient relationship”). For example, a duty to disclose would likely arise when a physician, while 
looking at the records of a former patient, notices an undisclosed diagnostic result that indicates an 
EMR. 
 136. See, e.g., Wohlgemuth v. Meyer, 293 P.2d 816, 820 (Cal. Ct. App. 1956); Gates v. Jenson, 
595 P.2d 919, 923 (Wash. 1979); see also LeBlang & King, supra note 118, at 1.  
 137. Nardone v. Reynolds, 538 F.2d 1131, 1135 (5th Cir. 1976) (quoting Nardone v. Reynolds, 
333 So. 2d 25, 39 (Fla. 1976)); see also Tetsone v. Adams, 373 So. 2d 362, 363 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 
1979) (holding that physicians have a fiduciary duty to disclose known facts regarding the patient’s 
condition). 
 138. Gates, 595 P.2d at 923.  
 139. Nixdorf v. Hicken, 612 P.2d 348, 354 (Utah 1980) (stating that disclosure is required “[i]f a 
reasonable person in the position of the plaintiff would consider the information important in choosing 
a course of treatment”). For an example of the adoption of the “reasonable patient” standard in 
conjunction with assessing the nature of the disclosure needed to satisfy the requirements of informed 
consent, see Carr v. Strode, 904 P.2d 489 (Haw. 1995).  
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standard resonates with the notion that the fiduciary duty to disclose 
EMRs is linked to respect for patient autonomy.  
Typically, courts have required disclosure only of material facts. For 
example, in a case where a doctor left a surgical cutting needle inside his 
patient’s body, the court held that the fiduciary relationship “creates a duty 
in the physician to disclose to his patient any material information 
concerning the patient’s physical condition.”140 Using the doctrine of 
informed consent as a model, the court defined “materiality” by stating 
that “[i]f a reasonable person in the position of the plaintiff would consider 
the information important in choosing a course of treatment then the 
information is material and disclosure required.”141 Under this definition, 
the disclosed information should at least encompass the existence and 
extent of the patient’s EMR.142  
As long as a physician adequately discloses the existence and extent of 
an EMR, a court will likely be relatively unconcerned about the specific 
content and manner of the disclosure. The purpose of the disclosure is to 
ensure that the patient receives information that is potentially vital to his 
or her medical well-being. In meeting this goal, the physician should be 
able to decide how to craft the disclosure. The best way of transmitting 
this information will vary somewhat from patient to patient. Doctors, 
exercising their medical expertise, can shape their disclosure accordingly. 
For example, some patients will have a relatively sophisticated 
understanding of their medical condition and risk, while other patients 
may need a detailed explanation of the risk they now face. But, similar to 
obtaining informed consent, a physician should not ignore any readily 
apparent special needs of a patient in making the necessary disclosure.143  
Some scholars have expressed concern that a disclosing physician may 
feel compelled to “choose words carefully,” avoiding the word “error” or 
admissions of liability.144 But a doctor need not focus on or admit error to 
 
 
 140. Nixdorf, 612 P.2d at 354; see also Wohlgemuth, 293 P.2d at 820 (requiring that the physician, 
as fiduciary, “make full and fair disclosure of all facts which materially affect the patient’s rights and 
interests”).  
 141. Nixdorf, 612 P.2d at 354; see also Gates, 595 P.2d at 922–23 (directing that physicians must 
disclose those facts to patients about their medical condition that patients need to make informed 
decisions about medical care).  
 142. An institution’s ethics committee or quality review board could provide reliable guidance on 
the nature of the necessary disclosure. See Wu et al., supra note 78, at 773. 
 143. See generally Jacobo v. Binur, 70 S.W.3d 330 (Tex. App. 2002) (ruling that plaintiff could 
proceed with her claim asserting that a physician did not obtain informed consent to a double 
mastectomy because the patient needed a more accurate description of her risk for breast cancer when 
her mother had just died from breast cancer, the patient was distressed, and she needed more 
consultation, support, and information).  
 144. Gallagher et al., supra note 11, at 1001, 1003. 
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communicate an EMR. If a physician tells a patient all material 
information necessary to disclose an EMR, then the scope, content, and 
manner of the disclosure should be left to the physician’s discretion. 
Indeed, the American College of Physicians urges doctors to consider each 
patient’s individual needs when disclosing medical error, with variation 
permitted in the pace of disclosure to ensure that the information is 
understood.145 Critical factors include providing disclosure in a setting and 
in a manner that allows the physician to share the information effectively, 
and ensuring that the patient adequately understands the meaning of the 
disclosed information.146 Assuming the patient is capable of understanding 
this information,147 concerns that a disclosure may be viewed as admitting 
error should not preclude a doctor from disclosing an EMR.148 
VII. A BREACH OF THE FIDUCIARY DUTY TO DISCLOSE AN EMR 
A. Elements  
A patient can seek damages if a physician fails to disclose a material 
EMR—a risk that materially endangers the medical condition of the 
patient—of which the physician was aware but the patient was not. The 
law entitles an individual to recover damages for a breach of fiduciary 
duty.149 After establishing the existence of a physician-patient relationship, 
 
 
 145. American College of Physicians, supra note 19, at 950. 
 146. See Berman, supra note 11, at 202 (recording comments of leading health care quality expert 
Dr. Albert W. Wu, describing how best to disclose errors to patients); Kapp, supra note 116, at 766 
(“[F]rank and open communication is more likely to maintain and renew than to harmfully rupture the 
therapeutic relationship between the physician and patient.”); cf. Thomas L. Hafemeister, End-of-Life 
Decision Making, Therapeutic Jurisprudence, and Preventive Law: Hierarchical v. Consensus-Based 
Decision-Making Model, 41 ARIZ. L. REV. 329, 360 (1999) (emphasizing the “importance of health 
care providers promoting the sharing of information and responsibility, enhancing communication, and 
providing support and counseling for those individuals involved in the decision-making process”). 
 147. If not, the physician should disclose the information to an appropriate surrogate.  
 148. Wu et al., supra note 78, at 773; see also Berman, supra note 11, at 199, 202. Indeed, a 
number of states have enacted “I’m Sorry” legislation to shield physicians and other health-care 
providers from potential malpractice liability based on their conversations with a patient following an 
adverse medical event. See States Making It Safer for Doctors to Say ‘Sorry’: Apologizing Isn’t 
Always Allowed, but Can Defuse Anger, Avoid Lawsuits, MSNBC, Apr. 11, 2007, http://www.msnbc. 
msn.com/id/18059841/ (citing the American Medical Association for its finding that twenty-seven 
states have passed laws that “allow physicians to apologize when things go wrong without having to 
fear that their words will be used against them in court”). See generally Ebert, supra note 59, at 337; 
Robbennolt, supra note 59; Sack, supra note 59. 
 149. DOBBS, supra note 107, at 1392–93; see generally Meinhard v. Salmon, 164 N.E. 545 (N.Y. 
1928); Moore v. Regents of the Univ. of Cal., 793 P.2d 479 (Cal. 1990); Mehlman, supra note 101; 
Forell & Sortun, supra note 29; RESTATEMENT (FIRST) OF RESTITUTION § 138, cmt. a (1937) (noting 
that “[a] fiduciary who commits a breach of his duty as fiduciary is guilty of tortious conduct and the 
https://openscholarship.wustl.edu/law_lawreview/vol86/iss5/3
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the patient must show that the physician became aware150 of the EMR, 
either in the course of the physician-patient relationship or in a reasonable 
period of time after the relationship ended. Because it has been widely 
accepted that doctors have an ethical obligation to disclose a discovered 
EMR to a patient, the gist of this legal claim is that the physician favored a 
personal interest over the patient’s interest and permitted this conflict of 
interest to impede the physician’s fiduciary duty.151 The physician’s 
conflict of interest may be financial or emotional. As discussed previously, 
the physician may have failed to disclose the EMR because of a fear of 
professional discipline, reputational damage, or litigation.152  
Moreover, a plaintiff must establish what information a physician 
needed to disclose under the existing circumstances to adequately inform 
the patient of the EMR, with the physician required to make a good faith 
disclosure reasonably calculated to inform the patient of this condition. 
This will generally be determined by assessing what a reasonable person 
in the patient’s position would have considered to be material information 
under the circumstances. But to the extent that the plaintiff can show that 
the physician knew or should have known of special characteristics of the 
patient (e.g., impaired hearing) that required an alternative means of 
disclosure to ensure the nature of the EMR was adequately conveyed to 
the patient, the physician will be expected to use a reasonable alternative 
 
 
beneficiary can obtain redress either at law or in equity for the harm done”). For a discussion of 
damages, see infra notes 167–76 and accompanying text. 
 150. As noted earlier, some jurisdictions appear to expand the basis for imposing liability by 
adding the equivalent of a “should have been aware” standard to the actual knowledge requirement. 
See supra note 138 and accompanying text. This has the effect of imposing liability on a physician for 
negligently failing to detect the EMR. Because the focus of the fiduciary duty is on loyalty rather than 
competence, this expansion seems unwarranted and is inconsistent with the majority of those rulings 
that have recognized a physician’s fiduciary duty to disclose a discovered EMR. 
 151. Hafemeister & Bryan, supra note 99, at 522 (“Fiduciaries must act to protect and enhance the 
best interests of the beneficiary and cannot use their position to promote their own interests at the 
expense of the beneficiary. They are held to the highest level of loyalty and good faith, [and] are 
prohibited from putting themselves in positions where their interests and the beneficiary’s interests 
conflict.”); Hafemeister & Gulbrandsen, supra note 48, at 372 (“[P]atients—and society in general—
must be able to trust physicians, rely on their loyalty, and rest assured that physicians will place the 
patient’s best interests above all other potentially competing interests.”); Mehlman, supra note 101, at 
1150. While this cause of action could be formulated as a dignitary tort that permits recovery 
following the breach of a fiduciary duty, notwithstanding that the patient has not incurred damages 
from this breach, this formulation of this cause of action has not succeeded in parallel circumstances. 
Id. at 1152–53. In Canterbury v. Spence and other cases, courts have refused to allow patients to 
recover for a physician’s failure to obtain informed consent—sometimes described as a fiduciary 
duty—when the patient incurred no harm or damages as the result of a failure to disclose the risks, 
benefits, and alternatives needed to acquire informed consent prior to the commencement of treatment. 
Id.  
 152. See supra notes 44–55 and accompanying text. 
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means of disclosure. The plaintiff must also show that any disclosure the 
physician made failed to meet this standard.153  
Further, a plaintiff must establish that a “reasonable patient” under 
these or similar circumstances would have pursued medical care or taken 
other related steps following the disclosure of the EMR that were 
significantly different from the course actually taken by the patient.154 The 
plaintiff must also show that, as a result of the nondisclosure, the patient 
sustained injury—either from failing to obtain needed treatment or from 
failing to take other related steps in a timely manner to address the EMR. 
Finally, as discussed below, the patient must show damages from that 
injury.  
B. Defenses 
After a plaintiff establishes a prima facie case, the physician can rebut 
the allegation if the physician can show by a preponderance of the 
evidence that: (1) the physician did not owe a fiduciary duty to the patient 
(e.g., a physician-patient relationship did not exist at the time of discovery 
or the discovery was not made in a reasonable period of time after the 
relationship ended), (2) the physician did not have actual knowledge of an 
EMR, (3) what the physician discovered was not a material risk, (4) a 
reasonable patient who received disclosure would not have pursued a 
course of action significantly different from that followed by this patient, 
or (5) the patient was not harmed by the physician’s failure to provide 
timely disclosure.155  
Physicians may also attempt to counter these breach-of-fiduciary-duty 
suits through several affirmative defenses, but few circumstances excuse 
nondisclosure of a material EMR. First, a doctor may shift the blame to the 
patient for not discovering the EMR.156 The physician may assert that a 
 
 
 153. As established earlier, the manner of disclosure is not usually relevant to this cause of action, 
as a fiduciary duty focuses on the failure to disclose—not the manner of disclosure—unless the 
manner of disclosure was so poorly done as to constitute a “non-disclosure.” See supra notes 142–48 
and accompanying text.  
 154. This standard is modeled on the informed-consent requirement that patients must show that 
they would not have pursued the course they did (e.g., undergone medical treatment) if disclosure had 
been made. See FURROW ET AL., supra note 44, at 334 (noting that if the court finds a breach of the 
duty to disclose, before awarding damages, it must also conclude “that the operation would not have 
taken place if the risk had been disclosed”). 
 155. See Mehlman, supra note 101, at 1150–51. 
 156. Vogel & Delgado, supra note 65, at 81.  
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reasonable patient would have known of the EMR and taken appropriate 
steps to avoid or minimize related harm.157  
Second, physicians can claim that they could not reasonably locate the 
patient, thereby precluding them from disclosure.158 But this defense 
should be available only under relatively rare and unusual 
circumstances.159 Generally, disclosure of an EMR should occur as soon as 
practicable after the discovery, and a doctor will typically discover EMRs 
in the course of an ongoing physician-patient relationship. As a result, the 
physician should have little difficulty finding the patient to provide a 
disclosure.  
A physician may also claim therapeutic privilege, a defense that allows 
doctors to withhold information about known risks from patients who may 
become so emotionally distraught by the information that they could 
endanger themselves.160 Courts and scholars have castigated the 
therapeutic-privilege doctrine, in part because little evidence supports the 
notion that significant harm will result from disclosing a medical risk.161 In 
addition, the watershed ruling in Canterbury v. Spence sought to keep the 
therapeutic-privilege exception “carefully circumscribed” in the context of 
informed consent so as not to “devour the disclosure rule itself.”162 
Further, recent studies discredit the defense’s rationale by showing that 
patients do not wish to be kept in the dark, but rather want full disclosure 
 
 
 157. As an extreme example, where a physician has amputated the wrong leg, this EMR will 
generally be obvious to the patient, and although the physician may face a lawsuit for medical 
malpractice, the physician should not be exposed to liability for a failure to disclose the EMR. The 
patient has sufficient notice of the EMR to enable the patient to take appropriate steps in response.  
 158. Vogel & Delgado, supra note 65, at 82. In some circumstances—such as where the patient 
lacks decision-making capacity—it may be appropriate to disclose the EMR to the patient’s surrogate. 
 159. The most likely circumstance where this would arise would involve a discovered EMR that 
pertains to a former patient. It may be difficult to locate a former patient. Nevertheless, reasonable 
efforts to locate and contact a former patient can be expected. See, e.g., Tresemer v. Barke, 150 Cal. 
Rptr. 384, 393–94 (Ct. App. 1978) (recognizing the existence of a cause of action when a physician 
failed to warn his former patient of the dangerous effects of an intrauterine device after the physician 
learned of these hazards).  
 160. FURROW ET AL., supra note 44, at 336; see also Wu et al., supra note 78, at 771 (suggesting 
that a physician need not disclose if the information provided would actually undermine patient 
autonomy, such as in cases of severe depression or deliberate waiver); Canterbury v. Spence, 464 F.2d 
772, 789 (D.C. Cir. 1972) (recognizing the therapeutic privilege as an exception to obtaining informed 
consent because “patients occasionally become so ill or emotionally distraught on disclosure as to 
foreclose a rational decision”). 
 161. FURROW ET AL., supra note 44, at 337. Even when given a poor prognosis, patients and their 
families generally appreciate full disclosure. See, e.g., Robert Wood Johnson Foundation, Studies 
Suggest Cancer Patients, Families Respond Better to Frank Prognoses (July 13, 2007), 
http://www.rwjf.org/programareas/features/digest.jsp?id=5955&pid=1142&c=EMC-ND142. 
 162. 464 F.2d 772, 789 (D.C. Cir. 1972). 
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from their physicians.163 While many statutes include therapeutic privilege 
as a possible exception to the duty to disclose a risk to a patient when 
seeking informed consent, only rarely is a therapeutic privilege cited as 
grounds for dismissing a cause of action that asserted a failure to obtain 
informed consent.164  
Further, few circumstances are appropriate for claiming therapeutic 
privilege as grounds for nondisclosure. Even patients who have been 
found incompetent may have some capacity to understand an EMR 
disclosure, although a family member or other guardian should be present 
to help the patient fully grasp the implications of the information shared. 
Certainly, the patient’s surrogate should be given the relevant information. 
And when the patient stabilizes or regains decision-making capacity, a 
physician has no reason to withhold information about an EMR from the 
patient.165 Thus, the defense of therapeutic privilege is significantly 
limited.166  
C. Damages 
A patient who has not received adequate disclosure of an EMR merits 
both equitable relief167 and compensatory damages for resulting economic 
and noneconomic injuries.168 One equitable remedy is restitution, which 
entitles the beneficiary to the benefits derived by the fiduciary as a result 
of the breach of duty.169 Courts also have broad discretion to fashion 
 
 
 163. See, e.g., Gallagher et al., supra note 11, at 1006; Wilkinson et al., supra note 30, at 97, 98. 
 164. FURROW ET AL., supra note 44, at 337. 
 165. Vogel & Delgado, supra note 65, at 82. 
 166. See also LeBlang & King, supra note 118, at 51 (noting that limitations like therapeutic 
privilege “lie at the periphery of an otherwise comprehensive duty”). 
 167. Mehlman, supra note 101, at 1149. The Employee Retirement Income Security Act (ERISA) 
also allows an individual plan participant to seek equitable remedies for breach of fiduciary duty. See 
Varity Corp. v. Howe, 516 U.S. 489, 510–13, 515 (1996) (finding that 29 U.S.C. § 1132(a)(3) allows 
individual actions for equitable relief for breaches of fiduciary duty). Recovery seems limited, 
however, to “classic” equitable remedies. Mertens v. Hewitt Assocs., 508 U.S. 248, 257–58 (1993). 
These traditional equitable remedies include restitution, as well as injunctive and specific relief. 
Knieriem v. Group Health Plan, Inc., 434 F.3d 1058, 1061 (8th Cir. 2006). See also Thomas R. 
McLean & Edward P. Richards, Managed Care Liability for Breach of Fiduciary Duty After Pegram v. 
Herdrich: The End of ERISA Preemption for State Law Liability for Medical Care Decision Making, 
53 FLA. L. REV. 1, 44–46 (2001) (discussing equitable and compensatory relief for breach of fiduciary 
duty); Dante Figueroa, Civil Law Trusts in Latin America: Is the Lack of Trusts an Impediment for 
Expanding Business Opportunities in Latin America?, 24 ARIZ. J. INT’L & COMP. L. 701, 730 (2007) 
(observing that in common law jurisdictions, equitable remedies are broadly available to beneficiaries 
who allege breaches of fiduciary duty). 
 168. Mehlman, supra note 101, at 1153.  
 169. See Mertens, 508 U.S. at 255 (traditional equitable remedies include restitution); 
RESTATEMENT (FIRST) OF RESTITUTION § 138, cmt. a (1937) (noting that a beneficiary who suffers a 
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equitable remedies that meet the practical demands of the situation.170 One 
scholar has proposed that in a managed-care setting, the remedy for a 
medical mistake should be the value the physician received from the 
patient’s health plan when the patient’s care was endangered.171 He argues 
that this value includes the reputational and seniority benefits of being a 
successful physician and any money that the doctor actually received from 
a managed-care organization as a result of withholding care from the 
patient (e.g., as part of a capitation plan).172  
For compensatory damages, a court’s valuation should focus on the 
difference in medical costs between (1) what it would have cost to treat or 
otherwise address the medical condition in a timely manner, and (2) the 
cost to treat or otherwise address the harm when the patient discovered it. 
If the patient’s condition has worsened, the court may take into account 
any lost wages that result from this deterioration of the patient’s condition. 
Some pain and suffering damages attributed to the deterioration of the 
patient’s condition may also be appropriate.  
These equitable and compensatory remedies should serve to make the 
patient whole. They should redress the physical, financial, and emotional 
injury sustained by the patient as a result of the nondisclosure of the EMR.  
While most courts and commentators agree that a patient who prevails 
in a fiduciary-duty lawsuit is eligible for punitive damages,173 these will 
not be available or warranted in most EMR cases.174 Because an award of 
punitive damages is not designed to compensate plaintiffs for their harm, 
but rather to punish or deter inappropriate conduct, these damages are 
generally limited to intentionally malicious conduct.175 But in some cases 
of extreme physician disloyalty associated with a failure not to disclose an 
EMR, the required element of malum in se may be satisfied.176 A 
physician’s failure to disclose an EMR—especially if the doctor took 
affirmative steps to prevent the patient from discovering the EMR—
 
 
breach of fiduciary duty “is entitled to obtain the benefits derived by the fiduciary through the breach 
of duty”).  
 170. Lemon v. Kurtzman, 411 U.S. 192, 200–01, (1973); see also Amoco Prod. Co. v. Vill. of 
Gambell, 480 U.S. 531, 541 (1987); Franks v. Bowman Transp. Co., 424 U.S. 747, 763–64 (1976). 
 171. Mehlman, supra note 101, at 1153.  
 172. Id. at 1153 n.64. 
 173. Id. at 1149; see also E. Haavi Morreim, Medicine Meets Resource Limits: Restructuring the 
Legal Standard of Care, 59 U. PITT. L. REV. 1, 71–72 & 71 n.245 (1997) (citing scholarship, cases, 
and treatises in support of this contention). 
 174. BARRY R. FURROW ET AL., LIABILITY AND QUALITY ISSUES IN HEALTH CARE 243 (5th ed. 
2004) (“In the normal malpractice case . . . [p]unitive damages are extremely rare.”).  
 175. See, e.g., State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co. v. Campbell, 538 U.S. 408, 409 (2003).  
 176. Mehlman, supra note 101, at 1153 & n.65.  
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involves not only a violation of the prevailing standard of medical care, 
but also a breach of the physician’s ethical code of professional 
responsibility and the physician’s legal fiduciary duty of loyalty to the 
patient. As a result, punitive damages are perhaps more apt here than in a 
medical-malpractice case. In egregious circumstances, awarding damages 
for a failure to disclose an EMR may appropriately send a message that 
will deter this behavior. To show the requisite malice, a plaintiff must 
prove that the doctor knew that serious injury would result from a failure 
to disclose the EMR, yet still failed to do so. For example, if a physician 
discovers a malignant tumor during a patient’s unrelated surgery, but hides 
this information from the patient—fully realizing that the patient may die 
unless the tumor is immediately addressed—then the plaintiff may be able 
to show malice in the physician’s decision not to disclose. 
VIII. A BETTER APPROACH THAN A MEDICAL-MALPRACTICE OR 
INFORMED-CONSENT LAWSUIT 
A claim for a breach of the fiduciary duty to disclose an EMR may 
parallel medical-malpractice or informed-consent claims. The former 
involves claims that a physician has failed to adhere to the medical 
standard of care, while the latter reflects a physician’s failure to obtain the 
patient’s informed consent before providing medical treatment. Fiduciary 
law, however, establishes a separate cause of action with a distinct focus 
and distinct remedies. Further, fiduciary law avoids some pitfalls of 
medical-malpractice actions and some limitations of informed-consent 
suits. As a result, claims based on a physician’s fiduciary duty will help 
ensure and encourage the disclosure of EMRs. 
A. Medical Malpractice 
When learning that a physician did not disclose an EMR, a patient 
could file a medical-malpractice suit, alleging that the doctor breached the 
professional standard of care by failing to disclose. This approach has 
often dominated the discourse about a physician’s failure to disclose a 
medical error to a patient. For example, many cases have recognized the 
failure to disclose as a basis for extending the statute of limitations for the 
filing of a medical-malpractice claim.177  
 
 
 177. See, e.g., Harrison v. United States, 708 F.2d 1023, 1028 (5th Cir. 1983); Pedersen v. Zielski, 
822 P.2d 903, 908 (Alaska 1991); Walk v. Ring, 44 P.3d 990, 999 (Ariz. 2002); Brown v. Bleiberg, 32 
Cal. 3d 426, 439 (1982); Tresemer v. Barke, 150 Cal. Rptr. 384, 389 (Ct. App. 1978); Harvey v. Davis, 
https://openscholarship.wustl.edu/law_lawreview/vol86/iss5/3
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Formulating nondisclosure of an EMR as a medical-malpractice claim, 
however, will find little support in the medical community. Put mildly, 
doctors have a very negative view of medical-malpractice claims,178 in part 
because all adverse judgments and settlements must be reported to the 
National Practitioner Data Bank (NPDB).179 Listing an event in the NPDB 
is a potential lifetime sanction that can have dramatic effects on a medical 
career. For example, it may preclude a doctor from being listed as a panel 
member approved to provide covered services under a managed-care plan 
or from obtaining staff privileges with a health-care facility, which are 
generally necessary to enable physicians to admit their patients and use the 
facility’s resources.180 Casting nondisclosure of an EMR as a cause of 
action for medical malpractice—thus mandating NPDB reports and 
threatening the livelihood of physicians—may be an extreme response 
when physicians fail to disclose the discovery of a medical condition 
unrelated to the course of treatment they provided or an error that poses 
little risk of harm.  
Linking a failure to disclose medical risk to a medical-malpractice 
claim may also trigger a visceral reaction from physicians,181 possibly 
 
 
432 So. 2d 1203, 1204 (La. Ct. App. 1983); Schmucking v. Mayo, 235 N.W. 633, 634 (Minn. 1931); 
Reyes v. Anka Research, Ltd., 443 N.Y.S.2d 595, 597 (Sup. Ct. 1981); Borderlon v. Peck, 661 S.W.2d 
907, 908 (Tex. 1983). 
 178. See infra note 181 and accompanying text; William M. Sage, Medical Malpractice Insurance 
and the Emperor’s Clothes, 54 DEPAUL L. REV. 463, 464 (2005) (“For over a century, American 
physicians have regarded malpractice suits as unjustified affronts to medical professionalism.”); see 
also Maxwell J. Mehlman, The Shame of Medical Malpractice, 27 J. LEGAL MED. 17, 17 (2006) 
(describing the various reasons why physicians deem the medical malpractice system to be unfair).  
 179. In 1986, Congress established the National Practitioner Data Bank (NPDB) to record 
malpractice payments and disciplinary actions involving physicians and other health-care 
professionals. 42 U.S.C. §§ 11101–11152 (2000). Hospitals and managed-care plans access the NPDB 
to determine whether a physician should be a staff or network member, and state medical boards can 
also access the information in the NPDB. DEPARTMENT OF HEALTH AND HUMAN SERVICES, OFFICE 
OF THE INSPECTOR GENERAL, MANAGED CARE ORGANIZATION NONREPORTING TO THE NATIONAL 
PRACTITIONER DATA BANK (May 2001), available at http://oig.hhs.gov/oei/reports/oei-01-99-
00690.pdf. As noted, any entity (including an insurance company) that “makes payment under a policy 
of insurance, self-insurance, or otherwise in settlement (or partial settlement) of, or in satisfaction of a 
judgment in, a medical-malpractice action or claim,” must report “information respecting the payment 
and circumstances thereof” to the NPDB. 42 U.S.C. § 11131.  
 180. Cynthia E. Boyd, How Compliance Intersects with Medical Staff Issues: Credentialing, J. 
HEALTH CARE COMPLIANCE, Mar.–Apr. 2008, at 11, 12 (“The NPDB represents the portion of law 
that was included to enhance professional review activities by making certain information concerning 
medical malpractice payments and adverse actions available to eligible entities and individuals. Data 
bank information is an important supplement to the credentialing process because of the information it 
contains.”); Diane E. Hoffmann, Are Health Care Conflicts All That Different? A Contrarian View, 29 
HAMLINE J. PUB. L. & POL’Y 235, 239 (2008) (noting that being listed in the NPDB “may affect a 
physician’s future ability to be hired or obtain hospital privileges”). 
 181. See David M. Studdert et al., Medical Malpractice, 350 NEW ENG. J. MED. 283, 283 (2004) 
(“Few issues in health care spark as much ire and angst as medical-malpractice litigation. Physicians 
Washington University Open Scholarship
 
 
 
 
 
 
1202 WASHINGTON UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW [VOL. 86:1167 
 
 
 
 
overriding what physicians generally accept as an ethical obligation to 
disclose.182 A legal sanction for breach of fiduciary duty that does not 
entail a potential medical-malpractice judgment may encourage physicians 
to disclose EMRs without awakening these deep-seated fears.183 The threat 
of a fiduciary duty lawsuit could sufficiently change behavior while 
avoiding counterproductive effects.  
Some scholars contend that causes of action for a medical breach of 
fiduciary duty have languished because they are virtually indistinguishable 
from medical-malpractice claims.184 Although courts have widely cited the 
applicability of fiduciary law to the physician-patient relationship,185 they 
routinely rely on the traditional negligence standard rather than fiduciary 
duty as a basis for awarding damages to an injured plaintiff.186 Some 
courts have gone so far as to characterize the fiduciary duty claim as 
duplicative of a medical-malpractice claim.187 Other courts have held that 
breaches of fiduciary duty amount to medical-malpractice claims and are 
not separate causes of action.188 The United States Supreme Court ruling 
in Pegram v. Herdrich189 may have inadvertently provided support for this 
position while holding that treatment decisions made by physician 
employees of a managed-care plan did not involve the fiduciary duties 
 
 
revile malpractice claims as random events that visit unwarranted expense and emotional pain on 
competent, hardworking practitioners. Commentators lament the ‘lawsuit lottery,’ which provides 
windfalls for some patients, but no compensation for the vast majority of patients injured by medical 
care. Within the health care industry, there is a nearly universal belief that malpractice litigation has 
long since surpassed sensible levels.”) (internal citations omitted). 
 182. See supra notes 35–41, 50–55 and accompanying text. 
 183. Some commentators have asserted that the fear of medical-malpractice litigation by 
physicians is often times unfounded. See, e.g., TOM BAKER, THE MEDICAL MALPRACTICE MYTH 1 
(2005). 
 184. See Mark A. Hall, Law, Medicine, and Trust, 55 STAN. L. REV. 463, 504 (2002) (“[U]nder 
common law fiduciary principles, most courts have declined to allow suits for damages for breach of 
fiduciary duties based on financial incentives.”). 
 185. See supra notes 110–11 and accompanying text. 
 186. See supra notes 119–21 and accompanying text. 
 187. See, e.g., Neade v. Portes, 739 N.E.2d 496, 501–03 (Ill. 2000) (dismissing a suit alleging 
breach of fiduciary duty for nondisclosure of the physician’s financial conflict of interest as simply a 
medical-malpractice claim); D.A.B. v. Brown, 570 N.W.2d 168, 171 (Minn. Ct. App. 1997). 
 188. See, e.g., Spoor v. Serota, 852 P.2d 1292, 1294–95 (Colo. Ct. App. 1992) (finding that the 
breach of fiduciary claim replicated the plaintiffs’ malpractice claim); Neade, 739 N.E.2d at 503 
(stating that because the plaintiff needed to prove the medical standard of care in order to show that the 
fiduciary breach was the proximate cause of injury—the same standard as for a medical-malpractice 
claim—it was unnecessary to recognize a new cause of action based on a breach of fiduciary duty); 
D.A.B., 570 N.W.2d at 171 (holding that the breach of fiduciary duty claim was a mischaracterized 
malpractice claim); see also Mehlman, supra note 101, at 1154 (describing the attack by some legal 
scholars and jurists on a distinct claim for breach of medical fiduciary duty). 
 189. 530 U.S. 211 (2000). 
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imposed under the Employee Retirement Income Security Act (ERISA).190 
In dicta, the Court suggested that the fiduciary duty claims pursued against 
the managed-care plan were nothing more than malpractice claims.191  
But even if breach of medical fiduciary duty and medical-malpractice 
claims may parallel one another or overlap, it does not follow that they are 
identical or redundant claims.192 For the two scenarios described at the 
beginning of this Article, most will readily agree that for the patient’s 
well-being the doctor should disclose the EMR in both cases. But only the 
former—where the physician was the source of the EMR—would likely 
give rise to a medical-malpractice claim. Under the latter scenario—where 
the physician discovers an EMR that was not of his making and was 
unrelated to the treatment he was providing—a patient could not seek 
relief for medical malpractice because the physician did not make a 
medical “error.” Thus, relying solely on medical-malpractice doctrine will 
not address some types of critical undisclosed EMRs. 
In addition, the two claims have distinct elements and remedies and 
serve different purposes.193 As one court noted, “[p]rofessional negligence 
implicates a duty of care, while breach of a fiduciary duty implicates a 
duty of loyalty and honesty.”194 A breach of medical fiduciary duty claim 
addresses a failure to act in a professionally responsible manner, assessed 
by examining the ethical standards of the profession.195 In contrast, a 
medical-malpractice claim tends to focus on a medical mistake, assessed 
by considering the scientific and practice standards of the profession.196 As 
research suggests that the practice of some members of the profession is to 
not disclose,197 the appropriate benchmark for disclosure is the fiduciary 
standard of loyalty and honesty, not the professional standard of care.  
In an era of “consumer-driven health care,” where patients—rather than 
employers, managed-care plans, or government-funded entitlement 
programs—are expected to bear greater responsibility and risk in choosing 
 
 
 190. Id. at 214. Under ERISA, the administrators of a managed-care plan owe a fiduciary duty to 
the plan. 29 U.S.C. §§ 1001–1461 (2000). 
 191. Pegram v. Herdrich, 530 U.S. 211, 235 (2000). The Supreme Court later clarified that 
medical-malpractice claims are completely preempted by ERISA. Aetna Health, Inc. v. Davila, 542 
U.S. 200, 200 (2004). 
 192. Mehlman, supra note 101, at 1157. 
 193. Id.  
 194. Beverly Hills Concepts, Inc. v. Schatz & Schatz, Ribicoff & Kotkin, 717 A.2d 724, 730 
(Conn. 1998) (noting this distinction in a lawyer-as-fiduciary context). 
 195. Mehlman, supra note 101, at 1157 (asserting that “fiduciary breaches are far more immoral. 
. . . [A] simple malpractice error—an honest medical mistake—is not a moral error at all.”). 
 196. Id. 
 197. See supra notes 35–56 and accompanying text. 
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health plans and the course of their health care,198 it has been noted that “if 
anything, fiduciary protections for patients need to be increased,” not 
eroded.199 As a number of courts have ascertained that fiduciary law 
compels physicians to disclose EMRs,200 courts should generally recognize 
and reaffirm that a breach of fiduciary duty is an independent and 
appropriate cause of action that provides a crucial incentive to ensure that 
EMRs are disclosed to patients in a timely manner.201 Fiduciary law 
enforces physicians’ duty of loyalty to their patients, an obligation that 
falls outside the assessment of professional competence that lies at the 
heart of a medical-malpractice claim.202 Moreover, a fiduciary duty can 
accomplish this goal without alienating physicians. Because a breach of 
fiduciary duty does not necessarily signal medical malpractice, physicians 
will be sheltered from the severe effect of NPDB reporting and other 
consequences of a medical-malpractice suit.  
Thus, fiduciary law provides advantages over medical malpractice as a 
unique legal vehicle to remedy the recognized harm of undisclosed EMRs. 
While a medical-malpractice claim—and, as discussed below, an 
informed-consent claim—may also be appropriate,203 a cause of action for 
breach of fiduciary duty provides an important vehicle to address failures 
to disclose.  
 
 
 198. Mehlman, supra note 101, at 1172. 
 199. Id.  
 200. See supra notes 118–29 and accompanying text. 
 201. See Sherwood v. Danbury Hosp., 896 A.2d 777, 797 (Conn. 2006). 
 202. See id. 
 203. Indeed, although not as comprehensive as a fiduciary cause of action, some failures to 
disclose an EMR can be cast as medical-malpractice actions. The failure to disclose could be 
characterized as a breach of the applicable standard of care, established by current professional views 
regarding the necessity and appropriateness of such disclosures. Some courts have explicitly endorsed 
such a determination. See, e.g., Mansmith v. Hameeduddin, 860 N.E.2d 395, 406 (Ill. App. Ct. 2006) 
(finding that the physician breached the standard of care by not disclosing medical negligence to the 
patient); Simon v. Biddle, 946 So. 2d 733, 737 (La. Ct. App. 2006) (requiring a jury to decide whether 
a physician breached the standard of care by not disclosing that a tubal ligation was never performed 
on the patient). These suits require expert testimony to show that a failure to disclose violates the 
professional standard of care, unless a lay person would recognize that the failure to provide disclosure 
violates the professional standard of care, which may well be the case. See Taber v. Riordan, 403 
N.E.2d 1349, 1353 (Ill. App. Ct. 1980) (requiring expert testimony to establish the standard of 
disclosure “unless the matters involved are common knowledge or within the experience of laymen”); 
see also Nixdorf v. Hicken, 612 P.2d 348, 352, 355 (Utah 1980) (not requiring expert testimony 
because even the “merest tyro” would know that nondisclosure breached the standard of care). While 
medical-malpractice exposure is not the optimal approach, it does have some benefit. The threat of a 
NPDB entry, although perhaps triggering irrational responses from some physicians, may encourage 
most doctors to take notice of this legal duty. Fear of NPDB reporting could also act as a 
counterbalance to professional pressures to hide medical errors, inciting physicians to disclose an 
EMR rather than face devastating consequences later. 
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B. Informed Consent 
Another possible legal claim against a physician who failed to disclose 
an EMR involves a patient’s right to exercise informed consent. 
Physicians must disclose sufficient information for patients to give their 
informed consent before beginning medical treatment—an obligation that 
is often cast in fiduciary terms.204 Propelled by emerging respect for 
patient autonomy, the doctrine of informed consent developed within the 
courts during the latter half of the twentieth century.205 As noted earlier, a 
patient’s consent to medical treatment cannot be “informed” unless the 
physician has shared with the patient all material risks and benefits of a 
proposed treatment, plus any reasonable alternatives to that treatment.206 
By requiring doctors to tell patients about the possible future course of 
their treatment, the informed-consent requirement can be read to imply 
that further disclosure is warranted if the patient’s medical condition 
changes.207 Courts have indeed drawn an analogy between a physician’s 
duty to inform patients of possible risks of treatment and a duty to inform 
patients of later EMRs, noting that these parallel duties both spring from 
the obligations of the physician-patient relationship.208  
A cause of action based on informed consent, however, does not 
directly apply to EMRs. As one court noted in a failure-to-disclose case, 
“[w]hile analogy to the informed consent doctrine is helpful it is not 
dispositive.”209 Although the duty to disclose an EMR is similarly 
grounded in the fiduciary relationship, a distinct cause of action ensues 
from its breach.210 Lawsuits asserting a failure to obtain informed consent 
focus on the period before treatment commences, addressing whether a 
patient would have still undergone treatment after learning about the 
undisclosed risk.211 By contrast, lawsuits targeting nondisclosure of an 
 
 
 204. See FURROW ET AL., supra note 44, at 315–31; see also Canterbury v. Spence, 464 F.2d 772, 
782 (D.C. Cir. 1972) (establishing the informed-consent doctrine).  
 205. FURROW ET AL., supra note 44, at 311; see also Hafemeister & Gulbrandsen, supra note 48, 
at 361–62. The Centers for Medicare and Medicaid Services (CMS) has also issued regulations that 
require hospitals to establish policies and procedures that assure a patient’s right to request or refuse 
treatment. 42 C.F.R § 482.13(b)(2) (2007).  
 206. Canterbury, 464 F.2d at 782. 
 207. Andrews, supra note 44, at 374–75.  
 208. Taber v. Riordan, 403 N.E.2d 1349, 1353 (Ill. App. Ct. 1980); see also Nixdorf v. Hicken, 
612 P.2d 348, 354 (Utah 1980); see also LeBlang & King, supra note 118, at 3 (“The scope of the 
legal trend toward full communication between physician and patient extends beyond the traditional 
doctrine of informed consent.”). 
 209. Nixdorf, 612 P.2d at 354 n.20. 
 210. See FURROW ET AL., supra note 44, at 315–31; see also Canterbury, 464 F.2d at 782. 
 211. See FURROW ET AL., supra note 44, at 334 (describing informed-consent lawsuits: “if the 
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EMR consider the period of treatment and its aftermath. The question of 
whether a patient would have undergone treatment does not arise.  
Further, the duty to disclose EMRs is a freestanding obligation, 
independent of the duty to disclose the information needed to obtain 
informed consent. For example, in an analogous case involving 
experimental research, the court held that researchers had a duty to tell 
research participants that lead dust might contaminate their children’s 
blood, notwithstanding that the researchers’ awareness of this risk arose 
long after the subjects had given informed consent.212 The court held that 
this duty to disclose was “independent of consent” and in addition to this 
requirement.213  
A patient suing for breach of a physician’s fiduciary duty to disclose an 
EMR also has a far better chance of recovery than a patient suing for 
breach of informed consent. The causation element is more readily 
satisfied: it is easier to show that harm resulted from nondisclosure of an 
actual medical risk than to demonstrate that the patient would have 
forgone treatment if alerted to a potential risk.214 Moreover, a patient has a 
better chance of establishing damages from undisclosed EMRs than a 
patient who claims breach of informed consent.215 In informed-consent 
cases, only rarely are patients better off by forgoing the proposed 
treatment. Damages are much easier to show when an EMR was hidden 
from a patient and resulted in a concrete injury that could have been 
prevented or treated.  
IX. WHEN ANOTHER PHYSICIAN CAUSES THE EMR 
Information regarding an EMR is so vital to a patient’s well-being that 
disclosure should occur even if another physician was responsible for the 
 
 
court finds that a physician has breached his duty to disclose a risk which a reasonable practitioner 
would have disclosed to a patient (or a reasonable patient would have found material), and further 
concludes that the operation would not have taken place if the risk had been disclosed, then if the risk 
materializes and the patient suffers harm, the physician is liable for resulting damages”). 
 212. Grimes v. Kennedy Krieger Inst., Inc., 782 A.2d 807, 850–51 (Md. 2001). 
 213. Id. at 850. 
 214. See FURROW ET AL., supra note 44, at 333 (“Causation is established in an informed consent 
case if the plaintiff can prove a link between the failure of a doctor to disclose and the patient’s 
injury—first that the risk not disclosed in fact materialized, and second that a patient would have 
declined treatment if he had received full information about that risk.”). 
 215. See id. at 334 (noting damages arise in an informed-consent case “if the court finds that a 
physician has breached his duty to disclose a risk which a reasonable practitioner would have disclosed 
to a patient (or a reasonable patient would have found material), and further concludes that the 
operation would not have taken place if the risk had been disclosed, . . . the risk materializes and the 
patient suffers harm”). 
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emergence of the medical risk.216 Physicians may have a legal duty to 
disclose when they observe an EMR and learn that the physician 
responsible for the EMR does not plan to disclose this information to the 
patient.  
One commentator posits a duty to disclose the clinical consequences of 
all medical errors, even those committed by other physicians, because a 
patient will need that information to provide informed consent to further 
treatment.217 Indeed, the Fifth Circuit has declared that when several 
physicians are treating a patient and learn that one of them committed an 
error, the duty to disclose may apply to all of them—even if some of those 
doctors are unknown to the patient, like a radiologist examining the 
patient’s x-rays.218 Accordingly, a physician who observes another 
physician failing to disclose an EMR in a timely manner may be held 
jointly liable for this nondisclosure. Similarly, a doctor who knowingly 
impedes a patient’s discovery of an EMR—notwithstanding that this 
physician was not responsible for the emergence of the risk—should be 
jointly liable for any nondisclosure.219 When a physician is not responsible 
for creating the EMR, however, the doctor can satisfy “third-party” duties 
by urging the responsible physician to disclose, by notifying the relevant 
quality-assurance or risk-management staff of a failure to disclose, or by 
telling the patient directly about the EMR.220 
X. BENEFITS OF DISCLOSURE 
A duty to disclose EMRs benefits both patients and physicians.221 
Benefits to the patient include preventing or remedying harm, reducing the 
risk of any further harm, and enabling future informed decisions.222 After 
disclosure, patients will be in a better position to monitor their health and 
fully explain their medical history to new doctors, who in turn will be 
better able to provide appropriate and needed treatment. Further, patients 
 
 
 216. For example, Dr. Albert Wu asserts that a doctor has “considerable duty to ensure that 
disclosure occurs when, in the care of his or her own patient, another physician makes a serious 
mistake.” Wu et al., supra note 78, at 775. 
 217. Thurman, supra note 11, at 150. 
 218. Nardone v. Reynolds, 538 F.2d 1131, 1136 (5th Cir. 1976). 
 219. Sperandio v. Clymer, 563 S.W.2d 88, 90–91 (Mo. Ct. App. 1978); see also LeBlang & King, 
supra note 118, at 2 (noting conspiracy as a possible cause of action against nondisclosing physicians).  
 220. Wu et al., supra note 78, at 774–75. 
 221. Id. at 771–72. 
 222. Id. at 771. 
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may place more trust in their doctors and the medical system following 
these disclosures.223  
Physicians who disclose will benefit from knowing that they have 
fulfilled their ethical obligations, promoted their patients’ health and well-
being, and facilitated a level of communication that may quell possible 
future lawsuits.224 Likewise, doctors who provide services to these patients 
in the future will appreciate that their new patients are able to provide full 
and accurate information about their medical condition, which will help 
them provide appropriate and needed treatment. The duty to disclose 
EMRs—as opposed to a potentially more limited duty to disclose medical 
error—also shifts the purpose of disclosure from pointing fingers to 
sharing critical information with patients.  
If litigation should arise in which a claim of medical error is posed, 
physicians may also benefit from having complied with their fiduciary 
duty to disclose an EMR. These doctors will likely be seen in a more 
positive light for having attempted to help, or at least warn, the patient 
than those who did not disclose an EMR. Physicians who have failed to 
disclose could face both a medical-malpractice lawsuit and a breach of 
fiduciary duty lawsuit—enhancing their exposure to liability. Further, 
because disclosure gives a patient actual knowledge of the risk and the 
possible harms that may result, the patient is on notice of this medical 
condition and the associated harms that can occur. After disclosure, the 
patient generally has an obligation to minimize any harm that has been 
incurred, and to seek treatment or take other steps to redress the EMR; a 
failure to act may offset any legal damages available to the patient.225 
Also, EMR disclosure will prevent a patient from delaying pursuit of a 
lawsuit for any medical malpractice that may have occurred, as a plaintiff 
cannot toll the statute of limitations by claiming that the physician’s 
failure to disclose prevented the patient from discovering the injury.226  
 
 
 223. Berman, supra note 11, at 198. 
 224. Wu et al., supra note 78, at 771–72. 
 225. Burrell ex rel. Schatz v. O’Reilly Auto., Inc., 175 S.W.3d 642, 651 n.10 (Mo. Ct. App. 2005) 
(“Mitigation of damages is a well settled principle requiring that a party injured by breach of a tort 
duty make some reasonable effort to minimize the damages after breach and injury have been 
inflicted.”); see also W. PAGE KEETON ET AL., PROSSER AND KEETON ON TORTS § 65, at 458–59 (5th 
ed. 1984); Ostrowski v. Azzara, 545 A.2d 148, 151 (N.J. 1988) (“The doctrine [of avoidable 
consequences] proceeds on the theory that a plaintiff who has suffered an injury as the proximate 
result of a tort cannot recover for any portion of the harm that by the exercise of ordinary care he could 
have avoided.”); Hanson v. Boeder, 727 N.W.2d 280, 283 (N.D. 2007) (noting that a plaintiff injured 
by another’s wrongful acts has a duty to mitigate or minimize the damages, which includes taking 
measures through reasonable exertion or at trifling expense, and can recover from the tortfeasor only 
the damages the plaintiff could not have avoided through reasonable effort). 
 226. See, e.g., Harrison v. United States, 708 F.2d 1023, 1028 (5th Cir. 1983); Pedersen v. Zielski, 
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Full disclosure also promotes shared decision making, an approach that 
permits a patient’s insights to be coalesced with a physician’s medical 
expertise. The value of this approach is now widely recognized and 
supported by the medical community. The Institute of Medicine defines 
the physician-patient relationship as a “sustained partnership,”227 while the 
AMA’s Code of Medical Ethics asserts that “[i]t has long been recognized 
that successful medical care requires an ongoing collaborative effort 
between patients and physicians.”228 This dynamic partnership helps both 
the physician and the patient actively pursue the goal of better health.229  
The duty to disclose an EMR will advance shared decision making by 
expanding the knowledge base available to both parties and ultimately 
strengthening the relationship between physicians and patients. By 
disclosing known facts that are material to a patient’s health, the doctor 
sends “a powerful message to the patient that he or she is a trusted 
member of the health-care team, not a potential adversary—a view that is 
much more likely to be reciprocated than if the patient is left in the 
dark.”230 These conversations draw patients into the details of their current 
medical condition and help them chart their future health-care decisions. 
By improving communication and creating more realistic expectations 
about medical practice, disclosure strengthens the ties between physicians 
and patients.231 These bonds may help restore public trust in the health-
care system.232 
Further, the fiduciary duty to disclose EMRs will help untangle many 
health-care problems at their most fundamental level. By making the 
 
 
822 P.2d 903, 908 (Alaska 1991); Walk v. Ring, 44 P.3d 990, 999 (Ariz. 2002); Brown v. Bleiberg, 32 
Cal. 3d 426, 439 (1982); Tresemer v. Barke, 150 Cal. Rptr. 384, 389 (Ct. App. 1978); Harvey v. Davis, 
432 So. 2d 1203, 1204 (La. Ct. App. 1983); Schmucking v. Mayo, 235 N.W. 633, 634 (Minn. 1931); 
Reyes v. Anka Research, Ltd., 443 N.Y.S.2d 595, 597 (Sup. Ct. 1981); Borderlon v. Peck, 661 S.W.2d 
907, 908 (Tex. 1983). 
 227. INSTITUTE OF MEDICINE, PRIMARY CARE: AMERICAN’S HEALTH IN A NEW ERA (Molla S. 
Donaldson et al. eds., 1996). 
 228. CODE OF MEDICAL ETHICS, supra note 16, § 10.02; see also Robert Kotler, Let Patients 
Weigh in on Treatment Decisions, L.A. TIMES, Mar. 31, 2008, available at http://www.latimes.com/ 
features/health/la-he-practice31mar31,1,5494907.story. 
 229. See CODE OF MEDICAL ETHICS, supra note 16, § 10.02 (“Physician and patient are bound in a 
partnership that requires both individuals to take an active role in the healing process.”); see also 
Cathy Charles et al., Shared Decision-Making in the Medical Encounter: What Does It Mean? (Or It 
Takes at Least Two to Tango), 44 SOC. SCI. MED. 681, 688 (1997) (providing a model of shared 
decision making in which both parties work towards reaching an agreement on and share responsibility 
for the ultimate decision made). 
 230. Richard J. Croteau, Editorial: All Outcomes Should Be Disclosed, 29 JOINT COMMISSION J. 
QUALITY & SAFETY 556, 557 (2003). 
 231. Berman, supra note 11, at 198.  
 232. Id. 
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patient a knowledgeable sentinel for adverse developments, physicians can 
minimize further medical crises and expenses. Ultimately, this legal duty 
promotes the best interests of physicians and patients.  
CONCLUSION 
As a principle deeply entrenched in the medical community and the 
common law, the physician’s fiduciary duty to disclose EMRs deserves 
legal prominence. Recognizing this duty to disclose—and enforcing a 
cause of action for fiduciary breaches—will ensure that physicians share 
crucial information with patients that allows them to avoid or mitigate 
potential harm. By routinely disclosing EMRs, physicians will deepen the 
trust of their patients and enhance their partnership in health care.  
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